University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2000

Raising Arizona: Reflections on Sovereignty and the Nature of the
Plaintiff in Federal Suits Against States
Catherine T. Struve
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Indigenous, Indian, and
Aboriginal Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Public Law and
Legal Theory Commons

Repository Citation
Struve, Catherine T., "Raising Arizona: Reflections on Sovereignty and the Nature of the Plaintiff in Federal
Suits Against States" (2000). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1308.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1308

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

RAISING ARIZONA: REFLE CTI ONS 01\J
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE NATURE OF THE
P 1LAINTIFF IN FEDE RAL SUITS AGAINST STATES
Cath e r ine T . Str uve'

Ir~TRODUCTION

I.

. ........... ........ .......... ....................... .......... ..... .. ..... . 106

THE COURT'S CURRENT VIEW OF STATE SOVEREIGN

IMlVIUNITY ...................................................................... .... 113

A. The Court's Recent Decisions ..................................... 116
B. Alden and the Court's Theoretical Approach ......... .. .. 119
1. The formal analysis .......... ............................... .. .... 120
2. The functional analysis .......................... .. .......... .. . 121

II.
III.

IV.

QUI TAM SUITS AND THE FEDERAL-PRIVATE PLAINTIFF
DISTINCTION ............ ....................................................... . .. 124
ARIZONA AND SUBSEQUENT CASES .................................... 133

A. Arizona ........ ............................................................ .... 133
B. Later Cases ....................................................... .... ... ... 138
ARIZONA IN THE LIGHT OF ALDEN ..................................... 141
A. Arizona and the Formal Federalism Inquiry ............. 141
1 . Sta t e "d'1gn1'ty " and t n 'b a l su1'ts ............................ . 142
2. The federal government and Indian tribes ........... 148
3. The practices of the Court ..................................... 153

*Associate, Cravath, Swaine & Moore. Though Cravath, Swaine & Moore, and I in
particular, represent the Oneida Indian Nation of New York in Oneida Indian Nation u.
County of Oneida, Nos. 70-CV-35 and 74-CV-187 (N.D.N.Y.), the views expressed in this
Article do not necessarily reflect the position of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York or
of Cravath, Swaine & Moore or any of its other clients. I would like to thank Thomas D.
Barr, Richard W. Clary, Charles S. Duggan, Charles Fried, Drew D. Hansen, Alan J.
Hruska, Steven Paul McSloy, James E. Pfander, Robert J . Reinstein, Joseph William
Singer and David B. Wilkins, and my mother, Catherine T. A. Struve, for their
comments (on previous drafts) and encouragement. Any errors are mine alone.

J110JVTANA LAW REVIEW

106

Vol. 61

B. Arizona and the Court's Functional Concerns ....... .. .. 155
1. The role of the federal plaintiff. .. .. ... ...... .... ......... .. 155
a. Control .... ..................................... ... ............ ...... 155
b. Accountability ..... ............................... .. ............. 157
c. Influence ....................................... ........ ...... .. .... 157
d. Judgment .. .. ... ...... .................... .... .. ....... ..... .... ... 158
e. Burdens ... ... ...... ....... ... ...... ................................ 159
2. Fulfilling the t r ust relationship ..... .. ..................... 159
V.

ARIZONA IN PRACTICE ............................................... .. ...... 164

A. Does it Matter Who First Brings the Claim? .............
B. Can a Tribe Bring Additional Claims
and Seek More Extensive Relief? ........................ ...... .
C. Are There Special Pleading Requirements? ...... ........
D. Who Can Make What Arguments? .. ...........................
E. Does it Matter That a Tribe Might Appeal
Even If the United States Does Not? ................ .. .......
CONCLUSION

0

0

0

0

0

0

00

0

000

000

0

0

0

.. 0

00

0

0

0

0

0

000

00 • • •

0

.... 0

0

0.

0.

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

00

0.

00

•

•• •••

•

0

.. .

0

0.

164
166
167
168
169
172

INTRODUCTION

When the Supreme Court last Term handed down a trio of
decisions on state sovereign immunity 1 it provoked an
immediate outcry.
Justice Stevens, speaking in dissent,
reportedly "accused the majority of constructing a doctrine of
sovereign immunity 'much like a mindless dragon that
indiscriminately chews gaping holes in Federal statutes,"' and
warned that "the Court was returning to 'the brief period of
confusion and crisis when our new nation was governed by the
Articles of Confederation."' 2 Many commentators echoed his
concerns. 3 And while the direct, practical effects of the decisions
1. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
2. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Federalism; States Are Given New
Legal Shield by Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1999, at A1 (noting that this
language-from Justice Stevens' oral rebuttal-did not appear in his written dissent).
3. See, e.g., In 3 Decisions, Divided Court Strengthens States' Rights, STAR
TRIBUNE, June 24, 1999, at 17A (quoting Professor Chemerinsky as stating that the
decisions are "a radical change in American government" and that "the states can violate
federal law with impunity, and nowhere can they be sued for damages in a federal or
state court"); David G. Savage, High Court's Conservatives Change Balance of Power,
L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1999, at A1 (quoting Professor Tribe as saying that "Activism
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are far- reaching, 4 their reasoning is likely to have yet broader
influence.
In A lden v. Maine, a majority of the Court announced that
state sovereign immunity is a freestanding constitutional
doctrine 5 that ranks with guarantees such as "the right to trial
by jury and the prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures. "6
By embracing state sovereign imm unity as a
constitutionally protected right independent of the Eleventh
Amendment, 7 the Court gave itself license to determine

doesn't even describe these holdings. They are extraordinary."); bu t see, e.g., Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Editorial, Federal Power, Undimmed, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999, at 17
("Some of the reaction [to the decisions] has been hyperbolic.").
4. In Alden, the Court held that Congress's Article I powers do not permit it to
a uthorize private dam ages actions against states in their own courts. See Alden, 119 S.
Ct . a t 2266. In College Savings Bank, the Court upheld the dismissal of a suit under the
La nham Act on the grounds tha t (1) Congress could not abrogate state immunity from
claims under the Lanham Act for false advertising because such claims did not implicate
property interests protected under the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) state sovereign
immunity cannot be constructively waived. See College Sav. Bank , 119 S. Ct. at 2225,
2228. In Florida Prepaid, finally, the Court held invalid Congress's a brogation of state
immunity from patent infringement claims on the ground that it had not been shown
that the abrogation was necessary to remedy or prevent state violations of patent
holders' Fourteenth Amendment property interests. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at
2207, 2209-10.
Taken together, these decisions (1) reaffirm that Congress may not abrogate
state sovereign immunity under its Article I powers; (2) demonstrate that the Court will
scrutinize narrowly any attempt at abrogation pursuant to Congress's enforcement
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) foreclose the possibility that a private
litigant might escape the Court's sovereign immunity doctrines by suing in state court;
and (4) sound the death knell for the doctrine of constructive waiver.
5. S ee Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246 ("(T]he sovereign immunity of the States neither
derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.").
6. Id. at 2256; see also id. at 2246-47 (arguing that "the States' immunity from
suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today . .. except as altered by the
plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments"); compare id. at 2270 n.1
(Souter, J ., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ. , dissenting) (noting that in
contrast to the rights to jury trials and to freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, "the general prerogative of sovereign immunity appears nowhere in the
Constitution").
7. Some opinions prior to Alden had indicated that, in addition to the Eleventh
Amendment, more obscure constitutional principles of state sovereign immunity also
limited federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U .S. 410, 441 n .5 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J. , dissenting) (adverting to "contexts in which this
Court has invoked the constitutional plan to find a State was not amenable to an
unconsented suit despite the absence of express protection in the Constitution"); Monaco
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (refusing to "assume that the letter of the
Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against nonconsenting
States"); In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (stating that unconsented suits
against a state by its own citizens are barred by "the fundamental rule of which the
amendment is but an exemplification"). Alden, however, broadens that protection yet
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questions of state immunity by reference to the system of
federalism as a whole, unconstrained by the text or history of
the Amendment. 8 Accordingly, the Court supported its holding
in Alden by referring to the views that prevailed at the time of
the Constitution's framing, to background principles of English
and colonial law, to subsequent congressional and judicial
perspectives, and to the competing interests accommodated by
t h e federal system. 9
In practical terms, the latter consideration appears to have
carried the day, for at its core Alden concerns the allocation of
power, both between state and federal governments and within
the federal government. Alden invokes the Framers' "insight
that freedom is enhanced by the creation of two governments ,
not one." 10 While "Congress has ample means to ensur e
compliance with valid federal laws, ... it must respect the
sovereignty of the States." 11 In addition, Alden posits that the
separation of powers within the federal government helps to
protect state sovereignty: though Congress can enact laws that
bind the states, Congress generally 12 cannot authorize damages
actions by private individuals to enforce those laws against the
states. 13 Instead, in most circumstances such damages actions
must be brought by the United States itself-a rule that not

further by extending its reach to state courts. See Bernard James, The States' Rights
Cases Provoke Fire, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, August 16, 1999, at B10 ("With the cases
of the 1999 term ... the justices have extended the immunity of states beyond a mere
limit on federal judicial power into a natural and indigenous right of sovereignty with an
uncertain scope.").
8. However, the Alden majority maintained that its vision of the federal structure
implements the intent of the Constitution's Framers and ratifiers. See infra note 94.
9. See Part I.B. below.
10. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268; but see Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge , Jr.,
Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path:" A Theory of Judicia.l Enforcement of Federalism,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1463 (1995) ("In our modern regulatory state, two layers of
government seem as likely to impose double as to impose half the burdens that a single
layer of government would impose.").
11. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268.
12. For exceptions, see Part LA. below.
13. The dissenting members of the Court observed, however, that removing
Congress's power to authorize private suits against States would have the effect of
centralizing federal enforcement efforts against states. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2240 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
joined by Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, JJ ., dissenting) (noting that forcing Congress to
"create a federal damages-collecting 'enforcement' bureaucracy charged with
responsibilities that Congress would prefer to place in the hands of States or private
citizens .. . makes it more difficult for Congress to decentralize governmental
decisionmaking and to provide individual citizens, or local communities, with a variety of
enforcement powers").
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only forces the federal government to allocate scarce resources to
fund sud1 suits, but also requires the Executive branch to take
political responsibility for t he litigation. 14
The Cou_rt's r ecent proscription of most private suits against
states \Nill force a closer examination of what counts as a suit by
t he Unit ed States 1"---a question that is cun-ently the subject of
vigorous ciebate in the context of qui tam suits against states .
The
tcun device permits private persons to sue third
narties-on their o';vn behalf and that of the federal
gove-rnlTlent--and t o share t he resulting recovery with the
United States. 16 Recently, five Circuits have been asked to
deci(le whether p:rivate qui tam plaintiffs can bring such a suit
against an unconsenting state in the absence of the federal
1
·-t
1
• .,
1
govenl tn 2Ilt. 1 1 our vn·cun.s nave sma yes; one nas sma no; ana
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the j u dgment of
one of th e fo ur Y If the Court reaches the sovereign immunity
questioa, and if a majority of the Court applies the Alden
analysis, it appears lik ely t hat the immunity analysis will turn
largely Oil the U nited States' participation in, responsibility for,
and ability to control the litigation. Because qui tam suits in
which the United Sta tes does not intervene fail t o meet the
~Alde n Court's ":rule 18 that the National Government must itself
deem the case of sufficient importance to take action against the
State," 19 it appears probable that the Cour t would conclude that
states are immune from suit s pressed solely by qui tam
i

r.~

.r1 ·

"L

See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269.
See Evan H. Caminker, State Immunity Waivers for Suits by the United States,
98 MICH. L. REV. 92, 93-94 (1999) [hereinafter Caminker, State Immunity Waivers]
(noting the Supreme Court's view that, as part of the constitutional plan, states waived
sovereign immunity from suits brought by the United States, and observing that "[s]ince
the Court has severely curtailed congressional authority to abrogate state sovereign
immunity and has made specific consent to suit more difficult to prove, the ultimate
scope of state sovereign immunity turns in significant part on the scope of this 'plan
waiver' for United States suits").
16. See Par t II below.
17. See infra notes [97-100] and accompanying text.
18. This "rule" is dictum, at least insofar as it would extend to qui tam suits
against states. See Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 120 n.126
(observing that in Alden "the Court was illustrating a distinction between conventional
private suits to enforce private rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
conventional government-initiated suits brought by the Secretary of Labor. There was
no argument that the private plaintiffs were asserting any sovereign legal interests,
indeed, any interests other than their own personal ones; and thus there was no occasion
for the Court to consider the relevance, if any, of the form of litigation brought on behalf
of the United States.").
19. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269.
14.
15.
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plaintiffs .20
Alden's influence, however, will extend beyond ca ses in
which the U nited States fails to take an active part. Questions
concerning the United States' role-and the implications of that
role for st ate sovereign immunity-can also arise when the
United States itself litigates a claim against a state.
In
particular , one doctrine that merits reexamination in the light of
A.lden concerns litigation pressed jointly by the United States
and an Indian tribe. 21 Though the Eleventh Amendment applies
to damages suit s against states by Indian tribes, 22 the fe deral
government, in fulfilment of its trust obligations to Indian
tribes, can sue a state for damages on a tribe's behalf. 23 In
Arizona v. California ,24 moreover, the Court h eld that Indian
tribes can intervene in an action in which the United States
asserts claims on their behalf, and can participate actively and
independently in the litigation of the case. 25 The Arizona Court
r ecog:nized the importance of tribal participation in such
lawsuits as a means of involving Indian tribes in the
determination of their rights. 26 In fact, the Arizona doctrine has
come into increasing use in recent years as tribal litigants, and
the U nited States, assert claims against states for violations of
federal law.27
In a post-Alden world, however, Arizona's
usefulness might at first seem a point of vulnerability: to the
extent that Arizona intervention permits an Indian tribe to
affect the outcome of litigation, states'-rights advocates might
contend that Arizona offends Alden's notions of federal
accountability and control. Indeed, the tribes in Arizona were
20. See generally Part II below.
21. "Indian tribe" has long been a term of art in federal law. Accordingly, since
this Article examines historical interactions between Native American governments and
the federal system, it refers to such governments as "Indian tribes" or "Indian nations."
Cf Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 679 (1989) ("Using the words 'Indian tribes' ... underscores the
distinct political experiences oflndian tribes ....").
22. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781-82 (1991).
23. S ee Parts IV.A.l. and IV.A.2. below.
24. 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
25. S ee Part III.A. below.
26. See Arizona, 460 U.S. at 615.
27. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, Nos. 80-CV-930 & 80-CV-960, 1999 WL
509442, at '<13 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 1999); Seneca Nation v. New York, 26 F. Supp.2d 555,
563-65 (W.D.N.Y. 1998), affd per curiam, 178 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S .
Ct. 785 (2000); Seneca Nation v. New York, No. 93-CV-688A, slip op. at 7-9 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 18, 1998) (Mag. J . op.), adopted, Seneca Nation v. New York, No. 93-CV-688A, slip
op. at 2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1998); United States v. Idaho, No . CV 94-0328, slip op. at 8-10
(D. Idaho Nov. 9, 1995).
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granted leave to intervene precisely because they had something
to gain, and something to contribute, through their participation
in the suit-in short, because their positions differ ed in
pertinent respects from those taken by the United States.
As shown below, any apparent tension resolves itself upon
closer analysis. This Article examines Arizona intervention
through the lens of Alden's federal-private plaintiff distinction
and concludes that, even under the Court's current expansive
vie'N of state immunity, Arizona intervention is amply justified.
Part I of the Article reviews the Court's recent t reatments of
state sovereign immunity and describes Alden's focus on the
differences between suits by private litigants and suits by the
United States. Part II, using qui tam suits as an example,
discusses the likely doctrinal effect of the Alden Court's
ern phasis on federal participation in and control of suits against
states. Part III posits that the Arizona Court approved the use
of tribal intervention specifically in order to supplement-an d
sometimes contradict-the positions taken by the United States
and notes that none of the Court's subsequent decisions have
called this approval into doubt. Part IV argues that despite
Alden's emphasis on federal control, the Arizona doctrine
provides a permissible, and necessary, avenue for tribal
participation in United States suits against states. Part V,
finally, examines practical questions likely to arise from Arizona
intervention.
As the above summary suggests, this Article has a
It does not address competing
deliberately narrow focus.
theories of the Eleventh Amendment; 28 nor does it canvass the
28. The "diversity" theory, for example, holds that the Amendment was intended
merely to remove diversity jurisdiction as a basis for suing a state in federal court; under
this interpretation, states could still be sued by individuals in federal court on other
bases-for instance in federal question cases. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
120 S. Ct. 631 , 652-53 (2000) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting in part); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S . 44, 101-02 (1996) (Souter, J.,
joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 286-87 (1985) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting); Edward Hartnett, A "Uniform and Entire" Constitution; Or, What if
Madison Had Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 265 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole
Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 544 (1997); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State
Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13, 19; Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J . 1425, 1474-75 (1987); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The
Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhu'rst Case, 98 HARv. L. REV. 61, 67-68 (1984);
William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh
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weaknesses 1n the Alden Court's analysis. 29 Instead, it accepts
t h e Court's broad view of state sovereign immunity as a
constitutional principle and approaches Arizona intervention
from that standpoint. Similarly, in assessing the federalism
issues raised by Arizona intervention, this Article refers to
principles of federal Indian law withou t extensive examination
of their origin. Such uncritical use is generally inadvisable,
given t h e g-rim histor y of this nation's dealings with Native
Americans. 30 But since the Court's curr ent vision of state
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889,
1937-38 & n.257 (1983). A recent refinement of this theory argues that the Amendment
was intended to eliminate "party-based jurisdiction as a potential vehicle for the judicial
enforcement of old state debts" incurred before the Constitution took effect. See James
E. Pfander , History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh
Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1277-78 (1998).
Another approach-the common-law theory- m aintains that the Amendment
was intended to make clear that federal jurisdiction over suits by citizens of one state
against another state was not constitutionally required; in this view, the Amendment's
purpose was merely "to allow sovereign immunity to survive as a common law
requirement," but not to foreclose the possibility of congressional or judicial modification
of the doctrine. See Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign
Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 543 (1977). Similarly, proponents
of the "abrogation" theory believe the Amendment to limit only the power of the courts,
leaving Congress free to curb the states' immunity.
See Laurence H. Tribe,
Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of
Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 693-95 (1976);
John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against
State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1468-69 (1975). A literalist interpretation, finally, would bar all
suits against a state by citizens of another state or citizens or subjects of foreign states
(no matter whether the claim involves a federal question or not) but not suits by other
sorts of plaintiffs. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh
Amendment, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1342, 1371 (1989); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty
and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 65 (1989).
29. See, e.g., Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and
Breyer, JJ. , dissenting); Charles Fried, Editorial, Supreme Court Folly, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 1999, at A17 (describing the Court's opinions in Alden, College Savings Bank and
Florida Prepaid as "nothing short of bizarre").
30. Professor Frickey has observed that "[t]he history of federal Indian law .. . has
been filled with tragedy, a story in which the rule of law often has become a vehicle to
rationalize what can only be understood as crimes against humanity." PhilipP. Frickey,
Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in
Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 427 (1993); see also Resnik, supra note 21,
at 696 (noting that in contrast to the usual sources of federal power, "other, often
unspoken rationales--<:onquest, violence, force-are the primary sources of the power
exercised by the federal government over Indian tribes"); see, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. 515, 543 (1832) ("[Plower, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are
conceded by the world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom they
descend."). Thus, "unless injected with a heavy dose of historical perspective and legal
realism, formal lawyerly analysis not only fails to illuminate the issues in federal Indian
law, but can also result in deceiving conclusions." PhilipP. Frickey, Adjudication and its
Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754,
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sovereign immunity focuses on the structure of the federal
system as conceived by the Framers, the application of that
vision to tribal claims asks how federal law views Indian t r ibes
within the fede r al system-even if that view may be doctrinally
flaw ed. \Vithin these constraints, this Article examines how
A rizona intervention should fare under the Court's present
a n alysis of state sovereign immunity, and it is with the latter
t h at the inquiry properly begins.

I.

T HE COURT'S C URRENT VIEW OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The Eleventh Amendment's text, as commentators
fr equently note 3 1 and courts are constrained to admit, 32 provides
on ly that "[t]he J udicial power of the United States shall not be
constr ued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."33
Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
i\ mendment-or its penumbra 34-to bar a number of other kinds
of suits, including suits against a state by its own citizens, 35
1757 (1997); see also Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the Future: Natiue American
S overeignty in the 21 st Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 217 , 301-02 (1993 ).
31. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Constitutionalizing Federalism: A Foundational
Analysis , 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1237, 1266 (1997) ("Once one abandons the constraints
imposed by the confused and misguided federalism theory that has puzzlingly grown up
around the Eleventh Amendment, one is restrained only by the narrow contours of the
provision's text."); Shapiro, supra note 28, at 67 ("The language of the eleventh
amendment does not include the term 'sovereign immunity' or anything resembling it.").
32. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (conceding that "the
text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction
of the federal courts").
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XI .
34. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S . 775, 779 (1991)
("[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says,
but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms . ... "). One
commentator has remarked that the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence "involves a sort of penumbral reasoning: notwithstanding that there is
nothing in the Eleventh Amendment to bar suits not in law or equity or suits brought by
a state's own citizens from the federal courts, the Supreme Court has consistently found
that such suits are barred by general doctrines of federalism and state sovereignty that
are inherent in the constitutional plan, though not present anywhere in the
constitutional context." Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 1333, 1341 (1992); see also, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the
Constitution Without Really Trying: Lessons from the Repeal of Prohibition to the
Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 217, 219 n.12 (1995) ("To give
sovereign immw1ity some life . .. the Supreme Court has basically ignored the
Amendment's language and construed the Amendment as embodying or exemplifying
the concept of state sovereign immunity.").
35. See Hans v. Louisi a na , 134 U.S. 1, 4, 21 (1890) (holding that a state cannot be
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suits against a state by a foreign state 36 and suits against a
state by an Indian tribe. 3 7
Until recently, it seemed that there existed a range of
circumstances under which private plaintiffs cou ld nonetheless
sue a state. State officers could be sued for injunctive relief
pursuant to the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 38 a n d st ates
themselves could be sued under federal statutes that abrogated
state soverei~n immunity. 39 States cou ld, of course, explicitly
consent to suit, 40 and it also appeared p ossible-albeit
unlikely-t hat under certain very narro<N circurn_stances a state
could be found to have constructively waived immunity to suit. 41
l\!Ioreover, since the Eleventh .L<\men dment speaks only to "[t]he
Judicial power of the United States," some posit ed that state
sovereign immunity w as simply a principle of forum a llocation
which provided that states could not be sued without their
consent in federal court; under this view, plaintiffs could sue
states in state court without offending any federal constitutional
principle. 42
sued on a federal claim in federal circuit court by one of its citizens); see also Shapiro,
supra note 28, at 71 n.56 (noting, but disagreeing with, the argument that Hans "f[ell]
short of constitutionalizing sovereign immunity").
36. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1934).
37. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779, 782.
38. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Under Ex parte Young, the Court has recognized an
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity "for certain suits seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against state officers in their individual capacities." Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997).
39. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1989) (plurality
opinion); id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part) (agreeing with the plurality
"that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of the States" but expressing disagreement "with much of [the plurality's]
reasoning"); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (overruling Union
Gas).
40. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (noting
the "well-established" principle that "if a State waives its immunity and consents to suit
in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action").
41. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
131 F.3d 353, 363 (3d Cir. 1997) (positing, though not deciding, that "a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity can be constructively waived if: (1) Congress enacts a law
providing that a state will be deemed to have waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity
if it engages in the activity covered by the federal legislation; (2) the law does so through
a clear statement that gives notice to the states; (3) a state then engages in that
activity ... ; and (4) the activity in question is not an important or core government
function"), affd on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Note, Reconceptualizing the
Role of Constructive Waiver After Seminole, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1759, 1769 (1999)
(arguing that "constructive waiver represents a feasible means of fostering state
accountability for violating federal law within the bounds of the Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence").
42. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106
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'Within the p a st fevv yea rs , however, the Court has n arrmved
or eliminated all ft·tes e EtVeD.ues except for those held open by Ex
parte Young~ 3 and the d octrine of explicit state consen.t. 44 VVhile
YALE L.J. 1683, 1690 , 1708-14 (1997) (reviewing cases that support a fo rum -allocation
theory but noting the possibility "that a state may avoid the exercise of federal judicial
power simply by refusing to consent to a suit against it in its own courts").
43. Professor Vicki .J ackson has pointed out that the Court's analysis in Seminole
Tribe m ay portend a narrowing of the av ailability of r elief under the doctrine of Ex parte
Young. See Jackson , supm note 28 , at 498 . Ind eed, in Idaho u. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 52 1
U .S. 261 (1997 ), decided sh ortly after Seminole Tribe, the Court once more refused to
apply the Ex parte Young doctrine . S ee Jackson , supra note 28, at 546 (n oting that the
Court "twice in t wo Terms denied apparently prospective relief against state officers to
vindicate federal law.") But the holding in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, at any rate, is unlikely
to extend beyond its specific facts . See id. (noting that "Coeur d'Alene's reasoning may be
limited to its particular context") .
In Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the Court rejected an attempt by an Indian tribe a nd
certain of its m embers (collectively the "Tribe") to use the Ex parte Young doctrine to sue
a state in federal court to assert a beneficial interest in, aboriginal title to and the right
to possess the banks and submerged lands of Lake Coeur d'Alene. See Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe , 521 U.S. at 264-65, 287-88.
In addition to the relief detailed above , the Coeur d'Alene Tribe plaintiffs also
sought an order enjoining the defendants "from regulating, permitting or taking any
action in violation of' the Tribe's ownership interests in the land. Id. at 265. The Court
concluded that the relief sought was "close to the functional equivalent of quiet title in
that substantially all the ben efits of ownership and control would shift from the State to
the Tribe" and was "far-reaching and invasive" because it would entail "a determination
that the lands in question are not even within the regulatory jurisdiction of the State."
Id. at 282. Moreover, the Court stated, "lands underlying navigable waters have
historically been considered sovereign lands [and] [s]tate ownership of them has been
considered an essential attribute of sovereignty." Id. at 283 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, the Court concluded that "[u]nder these particular and special
circumstances," the Eleventh Amendment barred relief against the state officials
because otherwise "Idaho's sovereign interest in its lands and waters would be affected
in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its
Treasury." Id. at 287.
Even aside from the fact that the five-Justice majority could not agree how to
determine the applicability of Ex parte Young, compare 521 U.S. at 278-80 (Kennedy, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (advocating case-by-case analysis), with id. at 296 (O'Connor,
J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(criticizing Justice Kennedy's "vague balancing test"), Coeur d'Alene Tribe's holding is a
narrow one. Three members of the majority noted that in an ordinary case concerning
"ownership and possession of an ordinary parcel of real property," a court could
permissibly "find that the [state] officials had no right to remain in possession, thus
conveying all the incidents of ownership to the plaintiff, while not formally divesting the
State of its title," but contrasted the Coeur d'Alene Tribe case, where "the Tribe seeks a
declaration not only that the State does not own the bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene, but also
that the lands are not within t he State's sovereign jurisdiction." I d. at 290-91.
44. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2258 (1999) ("[W)e have not
questioned the general proposition that a State may waive its sovereign immunity and
consent to suit . . .. "). Under the Court's most recent decisions, moreover, Congress
retains some power to elicit such waivers, for instance by conditioning the grant of
federal funds on state consent to suit, see id. at 2267 (noting that "subject to
constitutional limitations" the federal government may "seek the States' voluntary
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the Court's recent rulings have obvious :impact on private suits
against st at es, they also indicate the general approach f~C!.vored
by a maj ority of the current Court in weighing questions of stat e
sovereign immunity.

A . The Court's Recent Decisions
In t erms of practical effect, the co1·e of the Cou r t's r ecent
holdings is that Congress can not abrogate state sovereign
immunity under its Article I powers. 45 This view impels , not
only the Court's decisions with respect to abrogat ion of
immunity from suit in federal cour t , but also its holdings
r egarding suits again st states in state court and concerning
constructive waivers of state sovereign immunity.
In S eminole Tribe v. Florida ,46 the Court held that the
Indian Commerce Clause 47 does not grant Congress the pmver t o
abrogate state sovereign immunity. 48 Since the Court conceded
that "the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater
transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government
than does the Interstate Commerce Clause," 49 the Cour t 's
holding required it to overrule the teaching of Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co. 50 that Congress can abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.51
Leaving no doubt as to the breadth of its view, the Court stated
flatly that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial
power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal
jurisdiction. "52
consent to private suits"), though the Court has indicated that Congress cannot make
such consent a condition of state participation in "otherwise permissible activity," see
College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2231 (stating that "the point of coercion is automatically
passed-and the voluntariness of waiver [of state sovereign immunity] destroyed-when
what is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise
lawful activity" rather than the denial of federal funds).
45. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 643 (2000) (noting that
Seminole Tribe ''held that Congress lacks power under Article I to abrogate the States'
sovereign immunity" and that the Court's decisions in College Savings Bank, Florida
Prepaid and Alden "reaffirmed that central holding of Seminole Tribe").
46. 517 u.s. 44 (1996).
47. U.S. CONST., art. I,§ 8, cl.3.
48. Seminole Tribe , 517 U.S. at 72-73.
49. Id. at 62.
50. 491 U.S. 1 (1989); see also supra note 39.
51. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S . at 66 (overruling Union Gas).
52. Seminole Tribe, 517 U .S. at 72-73; see also, e.g., Florida Prepaid Postseconda ry
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1999 ) ("Seminole Tri be
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Of course, Seminole Tribe did not strip Congress of all
power to abrogate state immunity; so long as Congress Jr.takes
its intent clear, 53 it may still authorize a private damages suit
against a state "in the exercise of its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment-an Amendment enacted after the
Eleventh Amendment and specifically designed to alter the
federal-state balance."54 H owever, the Court stressed in College
Savings Banh v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board 5'3 that this power extends only to "the carefully
delimited remediation or prevention of constitutiona l
violations. "56 Thus, for example, legislation to enforce t he
Fourteenth .l'unendment's guarantee of procedural due process
must meet certain strict requirements. Congress can validly
abrogate state sovereign immunity if such abrogation is
necessary to remedy or prevent state deprivations (without due
process) of property rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment; 57 but the Court has indicated that it will construe
narrowly what constitutes su ch a protected property right. A
federal statute prohibiting false advertising, for example, does
not protect a Fourteenth Amendment property right: "bu siness
in the sense of the activity of doing business, or the activity of
making a profit is not property in the ordinary sense," 58 since it
does not encompass the right to exclude others, which is "[t]he
hallmark of a protected property interest." 59 Moreover, even
when legislating to safeguard a protected property interest such
as trademarks 60 or patents, Congress cannot abrogate state
sovereign immunity unless it identifies state violations of
substantive Fourteenth Amendment rights and "tailor[s] its

makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its
Article I powers").
53. See, e.g., Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2205 (valid abrogation requires both
that "Congress has 'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate ... "' and that
Congress has "acted 'pursuant to a valid exercise of power"') (quoting Seminole Tribe,
517 U.S. at 55).
54. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S.
Ct. 2219, 2223 (1999) .
55. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
56. ld. at 2224 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5).
57. See id. at 2224-25.
58. Id. at 2225.
59. Id. at 2224.
60. See id. ("The Lanham Act may well contain provisions that protect
constitutionally cognizable property interests-notably, its provisiOns dealing with
infringement of trademarks, which are the 'property' of the owner because he can
exclude others from using them.").
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legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conch.H::t."61
Thus, the Court he ld in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Banh 62 that
Congress's amendment of the patent laws expressly to abrogate
state sovereign immunity from patent infringement claims was
invalid because Congress had neither identified a pattern of
patent infringement by states nor found that states deprived
patentees of state remedies for such state infringemen t. 63 VVhile
this analysis does suggest that if states took Florida P repaid as
a "license ... to lower t he Stars and Stripes and raise the ,Jolly
Roger" 64 the resulting pattern of unremedied infringement could
then provide a basis for abrogation, the Court's approach sets a
high bar.65
Similarly, the Court's view of Congress's abrogation powers
recently cemented its rejection of the doctrine of construct ive
waiver. Although the Court had held in Parden v. Terminal
Railway of Alabama State Docks Department66 that a state cou ld
constructively waive its immunity from suit by choosing to
engage in an interstate commerce activity regulated by federal
legislation, 67 the retreat from this holding had begun even before
Seminole Tribe. 68 In College Savings Bank, the Court "drop[ped]
61. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S.
Ct. 2199, 2207 (1999). The Court's examples of "limits" that might render legislation
more acceptable, e.g., "providing for suits only against States with questionable remedies
or a high incidence of infringement," id. at 2210, raise a number of questions, not least of
which is administrability. These issues, however, fall outside the scope of this Article.
62. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
63. See id. at 2207, 2209-10.
64. Peter A. Roberts (the owner of the patent at issue in Florida Prepaid), quoted
in Sabra Chartrand, Patents, N .Y. TIMES, June 28, 1999, at C12.
65. The decision this Term in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631
(2000), demonstrates that the Court will apply a similarly restrictive analysis to
determine whether Congress has legislated pursuant to its power to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 120 S . Ct. at 650 (holding that the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 is not a valid exercise of Congress's § 5
enforcement power, "[i]n light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act's substantive
requirements, and the lack of evidence of widespread and unconstitutional age
discrimination by the States").
66. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
67. See id. at 192 (holding that a state's choice to operate an interstate railroad
after the enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act constituted consent to suit
under that Act).
68. See Employees of Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973) (distinguishing Parden on the grounds
that the Fair Labor Standards Act (the statute at issue in Employees) did not clearly
express an intent to remove the states' immunity and that the state activity in Parden
"was in the area where private persons and corporations normally ran the enterprise");
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1974) (holding that in Edelman congressional
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noted Parden's conflict with the requirement that ·e xpress
waivers of state s overeign immunity be unequivocal,70 it also
relied heavily upon the restrictions on Congress's a bility to
a brogate. As the Court explained, "Recognizing a congressional
power to exact constru ctive waivers of sovereign immunity
through t h e exercise of Article I powers would .. . , as a practical
matter, permit Congress to circumvent the antiabrogation
holding of Seminole Tribe ." 71
In Alden u. Maine, finally, the Cou rt held that Congress
lacks the power under Article I to authorize private damages
actions against stat es in their own courts .72 As a prs.ctical
matter, Alden rounds out the set of cases that now precludes
most private damages suits against states; after Alden, it
appears that private plaintiffs suing alone may only sue a state
for damages if the state has consented to suit or Cong-ress has
abrogated state immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of its
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. Additionally, in a
broader sense, Alden illustrates the Court's current doctrinal
approach.
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B. Alden and the Court's Theoretical Approach
Alden's analysis proceeds along two lines, one formal and
one functional. The formal analysis examines a number of
factors, which may balance differently in different contexts and
not all ofwhich will necessarily shed light on a given question of
state immunity. The functionaF 3 analysis is simpler and more
authorization to sue states was "wholly absent, " but also noting that "[c]onstructive
consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional
rights"); Welch u. Texas Dep't of Hwys. & Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987)
(plurality opinion) ("[T]o the extent that Parden u. Terminal Railway . . . is inconsistent
with the requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress
must be expressed in unmistakably clear language, it is overruled."); id. at 496 (Scalia,
J ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that as a matter of
statutory construction the Jones Act and the FELA should not be read to apply to
states).
69. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2228.
70. See id. at 2228.
71. I d. at 2229.
72. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999).
73. As will be seen, the Alden Court's functional analysis is limited in important
ways. When the Court examines the effect that a particular kind of suit against a state
will have on the balance of power in the federal system , it does so in order to determine
whether the states consented to such a suit when they agreed to enter the Union- an
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basic balance struck_by the federal system.

1. The formal analysis
The bu lk of t he majority op1mon 1n Alden attempts to
support the Court's holding by resorting to "t he Constitution's
structure, and its histoTy, and the authoritative inter pretat ions
by this Court." 74 Thus, Alden illustrates that the Court will look
t o certain discret e fa ctors- relevant prov1S1ons of the
Constitution; the pronov.ncements of the Framers a nd their
contemporaries; backgroun d principles of English lavv; and
subsequent congressional and judicial perspectives- to inform
its discussion of state immu nity.
In A lden, t he Cou r t opened with an examination of the
Constitution itself. Th e Court contrasted "[v]arious textual
prov1s10ns of t he Constitution [that] assume the States'
continued existence and active participation in the fundame ntal
processes of governance'' with "[t]he limited and enumerated
powers granted to the Legisla tive, E xecutive, and Judicial
Branches of the N ational Government." 75 To complete the
p icture, the Court noted "th e Tenth Amendment, which, like the
other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was enacted to allay
lingering concerns about the extent of the national power."76
The Court then proceeded t o survey the views of "[t]he
generation that designed and adopted our federal system," in
inquiry that is generally non-normative and often somewhat artificial. See, e.g., Alden,
119 S. Ct. at 2268-69. To the extent that the Court confines itself to this analysis and
eschews any inquiry into whether the effects of the suit at issue are otherwise desirable,
its approach can rightly be criticized as formalistic. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism
and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 969 (1997)
(arguing that the Court's recent federalism decisions are "formalistic in the classic sense"
in that "(t)he Court has emphasized deductive reasoning from asserted premises and has
refused to give weight to functional considerations, whether based on public policy
needs ... or constitutional values"). This Article, however, uses the term "functional" for
convenience in contrasting the Court's semi-functional approach with its more "formal"
inquiry into discrete historical and judicial precedents.
More broadly, both the formal and functional analyses in Alden can be
described as originalist-insofar as they reflect the Court's "focus on the Framers'
original views," Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 112-or
"reconstructionalist"-to the extent that they seek to "reconstructO the most plausible
agreement [among the Framers) rather than interpretO conventional historical indicia
thereof," id. at 113. See infra note 94.
74. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
75. Jd. at 2247 .
76. ld.
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Thus, the Court in .Alden cited authorities from English law, the
ratification debates and documents and the Federalist P apers. 78
In a ddition, the Court turned to the lore of Chisholm v.
Georgia 79 and the "text and history" of the Eleventh Amendment
for fu.rther evidence of contemporary or near-cont emporary
views. 80
Next, the Court examined its own precedents and past
congressional practices. In the Court's view, Congress's actions
constitute a tacit acknowledgment of state immunity in that
"[n]ot only were statutes purporting to authorize private suits
against nonconsenting States in state courts not enacted by
early Congresses, statutes purporting to authorize such suits in
any forum are all but absent from our historical experience."Sl
Similarly, the Court maintained, based on evidence such as the
"sweepin g terms" with which prior decisions describe state
immunity, that "[t]he theory and reasoning of our earlier cases
suggest the States do retain a constitutional immunity from suit
in their own courts." 82 Finally, the Court measured the question
at hand against values that state sovereign immunity is
traditionally thought to promote-state dignity,s3 state
financess4 and. the integrity of state governmental processes.s5
.L

.L

2. The functional analysis
Having examined various discrete sources of information
that might pertain to the question of state immunity, the Alden
Court turned to a discussion of the balance of powers within the
federal system. This part of the Court's analysis centered on the
nature of the plaintiff.
The Court explained in Alden that "[a] suit which is
commenced and prosecuted against a State in the name of the
United States by those who are entrusted with the
constitutional duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2247-49 (1999).
2 u.s. 419 (1793).
See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2249-53, 2260-61.
Id. at 2261.
Id. at 2262.
See id. at 2263-64.
See id. at 2264.
See id. at 2264-65.
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executed,' U. S . Const., Art. II, § 3, differs in k ind from the suit of
an individual" 86-an admonition which echoes the Court's 1991
opinion in Blatchford v. Native Village of JVoatak .87
In
Blatchford, the plaintiffs contended, inter alia , that 28 U.S.C .
§ 1362 , which governs federal jurisdiction over federal claims by
Indian tribes, represented "a delegation to tribes of the F ederal
Government's exem pt ion from state sovereign immunity."88 The
Court, while r ejecting this argument on grounds of statutory
construction, 89 expressed its "doubt" that such exemp tion "can
be delegated-even if one limits the permissibility of
delegation . . . t o per sons on whose behalf the United Stat es
itself might sue." 90 As the Court saw it,
[t]he consent, "inherent in the convention," to suit by the United
States- at the instance and under the control of responsible
federal officers- is not consent to suit by anyone whom the United
States might select; and even consent to suit by the United States
for a particular person's benefit is not consent to suit by that
person himself. 91

In Alden, the Court expanded upon the differences-with
respect to state sovereign immunity-between suits by the
federal government and private suits.
First, "[w]hile the
Constitution contemplates suits among the members of the
federal system as an alternative to extralegal measures , t he fear
of private suits against nonconsenting States was the central
reason given by the founders who chose to preserve the States'
sovereign immunity."92 Second, "[s]uits brought by the United
States itself require the exercise of political responsibility for
each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent
from a broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting
States."93 Third, a suit by the federal government by definition
satisfies the "rule that the National Government must itself
deem the case of sufficient importance to take action against the

86. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
87. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
88. Id. at 785.
89. The Court held that there was no evidence that Congress intended § 1362 to
abrogate state sovereign immunity from suits by Indian tribes. See Blatchford, 501 U.S.
at 785-86.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
93. Id.
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State."94
94. Id. at 2269. In a recent article, Professor Evan Caminker argues that the
Court's emphasis on whether the United States itself litigates the claim against the
state is at odds with the Court's originalist appro ach to state sovereign immunity.
Professor Caminker points out that in prior decis ions "[t]h e Court has pointedly not
asked wh ether various aspects of sta te sovereign immunity, or even the concept in its
entirety, make sense in the modern world of expansive federal r egulatory power; rather,
the Court has insisted that the means through which this power is asserted and enforced
conform to its view of the Framers' original understanding as embedded within the
constitutional plan." Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15 , at 132.
(Indeed, in Alden the majority claimed tha t it sought to discover "only what the Framers
and those who ratified the Constitution sought to accomplish when they crea ted a
federal system." Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268.)
Professor Caminker posits that in the light of relevant precedent, the most
persuasive originalist explanation for the ability of the United States to sue states is the
"mutuality rationale. " "The reasoning in both Monaco and Blatchford . . . envisions
anthropomorphized states sitting around a bargaining table and agreeing to a mutual
pact waiving their immunity for certain kinds of suits but not others. As the Court
reconstructs this bargain, states agreed to waive their immunity only where doing so
would mutually benefit the parties to the agreement-meaning the states and the
United States-and not where it would altruistically benefit outsiders." Caminker, State
Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 110. In this view, the states would have agreed
that the United States could sue a state, both because such suits could enable the United
States to enforce the obligations owed by one state to another, and because such suits
could enforce obligations owed by a state to the federal government (obligations which
were "designed in large part for the mutual benefit of the states"). Id. at 110-111. Thus,
"[a]ccording to the mutuality rationale, a judicial forum should be available whenever
the United States seeks to assert one of the legal prerogatives or interests bestowed
upon it in the constitutional design." Id. at 113. Consequently, a state defendant should
have no sovereign immunity from suits where the United States is the real party in
interest on the plaintiff side. See id. at 114-15. Professor Caminker also asserts that the
originalist view should not focus on federal control of such suits, because "the Founding
generation evidenced little if any concern that prosecutors of federal law violations be
politically accountable to any centralized federal authority." Id. at 128. Thus, to the
extent that the Alden Court's functional concerns lead the Court to insist that suits by
the United States against a state be litigated by the federal government, Professor
Caminker argues that such a requirement "would necessarily reflect a methodological
shift from originalism to functionalism, at odds with the Court's claimed basis for the
legitimacy of this entire realm ofnontextual doctrine." Id. at 132.
It seems possible, however, that a majority of the current Court might reject
this elegant argument in favor of an alternative originalist justification for United States
suits against states. Professor Caminker notes the Court's statements, in Texas, Monaco
and Alden, that the constitutional plan must permit the United States to sue states in
order "to provide a forum for the peaceful resolution of intersovereign disputes"-a view
he terms the "hostility-avoidance" rationale. Id. at 106-07, 111. He rejects this rationale
because although it "would seem similarly to support an immunity waiver for suits
brought against states by foreign states or Indian nations," the Court has held that
sovereign immunity bars both such kinds of suits. Id. at 108. But the Alden Court
nonetheless stressed that "the Constitution contemplates suits among the members of
the federal system as an alternative to extralegal measures," Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267,
suggesting that it continues to give credence to this explanation. And if the Court
adheres to the hostility-avoidance rationale as the basis for United States suits against
states, it becomes harder to justify suits not prosecuted by the federal government itself.
If the government does not, as the Alden majority put it, "deem the case of sufficient
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At bottom, then, the Court's ruling in Alden was more basic
than its extensive survey of "history, practice, precedent, and
the structure of the Constitution" 95 m ight suggest. "The Court
said, in effect, that the F eder al Government should put its
money where its mouth is and enforce its own laws rather than
entrust them to private litigants." 96 This conclusion, in turn,
suggests a further inquiry: vVhat distinguishes a suit by the
United States from a suit by a private litigant?

II. QUI TAM SUITS AND THE FEDERAL-PRIVATE PLAINTIFF
DISTINCTION

The qw tam suit-which has fed some speculation
regarding the extent to which Congress might empower
individuals to enforce federal laws against states 97 -provides a
ready illustration of ways in which Alden's reasoning may
influence analyses of state sovereign immunity. A split of
opinion has developed between the Second, Fourth, Eighth and
Ninth Circuits, which hold that qui tam suits litigated solely by
a private relator are the equivalent of suits by the United States
for state sovereign immunity purposes, 98 and the Fifth Circuit,

importance to take [legal) action against the State," Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269, it seems
unlikely that the dispute could create a serious threat of military conflict between the
federal and state govemments.
95. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2260.
96. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Editorial, Federal Power, Undimmed, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 1999, at A17.
97. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress's Power to
Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REV. 539, 553, 556-57, 564 (1995)
(arguing that, since Congress can provide for the United States to sue a state for
damages arising from an injury to an individual and Congress may authorize private
parties to prosecute such claims on the United States' behalf as in "the traditional qui
tam action," Congress "might as well have the power to allow" such suits to be brought
by private plaintiffs in their own name); but see, e.g., Caminker, State Immunity
Waivers, supra note 15, at 134 ("Where the 'real party in interest' is private rather than
the United States itself, qui tam authorization feels like something of a bootstrap; one
might suspiciously view it as an effort to circumvent the Seminole Tribe I Alden rule that
Congress cannot authorize private parties to assert their 'own' interests against states.");
Jackson, supra note 28, at 506 n.46 (noting that Blatchford's reasoning "suggests that
Siegel's argument will be less successful as statutory schemes move closer to giving nonU.S. parties control over the litigation"); Vazquez, supra note 42, at 1706 n.110
(observing that Blatchford "throws cold water" on Siegel's theory); Scott P. Glauberman,
Citizen Suits Against States: The Exclusive Jurisdiction Dilemma, 45 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 63, 103 (1997) (arguing that "Siegel's article amounts to little more than an
end run around the Eleventh Amendment").
98. See United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162
F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999); United States ex rel.
Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154 F.3d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. dismissed, 119 S. Ct. 2387
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which holds that such suits violate state sovereign immunity. 99
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case d ecided by the
Second Circuit-United States ex rel. Stevens v. 1/ermont Agency
of Natural Resources 100-and the sovereign immunity issue is
one of the questions presented for t he Court's revievv. Although
the Court may u ltimately dispose of the Stevens case on other
gTounds,lOl qui tam suits nonetheless provide an informative
testing ground for Alden's analysis.
In qui tam actions , a private person "maintains a civil
proceeding on behalf of both herself and the United States to
recover damages and/or enforce penalties availa ble under a
statute prohibiting specified conduct" and "shares any monetary
recovery with the United States." 102 'ViThile the practice of
authorizing qui tam suits extends back through our nation's
history to its roots in E nglish law, 103 the most prominent current
(1999); United States ex rel. Berge v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama, 104 F.3d
1453, 1458 (4th Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d
957, 963 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 72 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 1995).
99. See United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 294 (5th
Cir. 1999). Although the Fifth Circuit declined to state whether the United States could
change the sovereign immunity analysis by intervening in the suit, it noted that Arizona
v. California "may be relevant to that question." F'oulds, 171 F.3d at 288 n.13.
The D.C. Circuit has avoided the sovereig11 immunity issue by construing the False
Claims Act not to authorize qui tam suits against states, see United States ex rel. Long v.
SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F .3d 870, 889-90 (D.C. Cir. 1999), opinion
supplemented, 173 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1999), but in so doing it discussed at some length
its "profound doubts that the Eleventh Amendment permits" qui tam suits against
states, see 173 F.3d at 881-86.
100. 162 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999).
101. The questions presented also include whether a state is a "person" subject to
liability under the False Claims Act. See, e.g., Stevens, 162 F.3d at 207-08 (holding that
states are defendant "persons" under the False Claims Act); Long, 173 F.3d at 889-90
(holding to the contrary). Moreover, just 10 days before the Court was scheduled to hear
oral argument in Stevens, it directed the parties to file supplemental briefs "addressing
the following question: 'Does a private person have standing under Article III to litigate
claims offraud upon the government?"' Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United
States ex rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 523 (1999). The State of Vermont responded to this
invitation by arguing that when a private qui tam plaintiff brings a claim under the
False Claims Act, either the claim belongs to the United States-in which event
Vermont argues the private plaintiff lacks standing to assert the claim-or the claim has
been assigned to the private plaintiff-in which case Vermont contends the suit is barred
by state sovereign immunity because it does not qualify for treatment as a suit by the
United States. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 1999 WL 1134650, at *53 - *54 (U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript, Nov.
29, 1999).
102. Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE
L.J. 341, 341 (1989) [hereinafter Caminker, Constitutionality].
103. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943)
("Statutes providing for actions by a common informer, who himself has no interest
whatever in the controversy other than that given by statute, have been in existence for
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example- and that at issue in each of t he cases decided by the
Circuits that have so far addressed the immunity issue-is the
cause of action provided by t he False Claims Act. 104
The False Claims Act provides that "[a]ny person" who
makes a fal se monetary claim to the federal government is liable
"to the U nited States Government" for treble damages and a
civil penalty of $5,000 to $10,000. 105 Besides authorizing the
United States Attorney General to sue violators, 106 the Act
.,
f'or " [a ] ct'wns by pnva
. t e persons. " rnh
prov:wes
1 1 us, "-l a ) person
may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the
person and for the United States Government. The action shall
be b1·ought in the name of the Government." 107 U nder the Act, if
the federal government decides not to intervene, the private
pl aintiff can prosecute the suit on its own.l 08 In return, the qui
tam plaintiff stands to receive as much as 30% of t he recovery.l 09
To the courts that countenance qui tam s uits against states,
the United States-despite its a bsence from the suit-is the
"real party in interest."110 Thus, it is the United States that
suffered injury from the defendant's false claim and it is the
United States that will receive "the lion's share-at least 70%-

hun dreds of years in England, a nd in this country ever since the foundation of our
Government.") (quoting Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905)), quoted in Caminker,
Constitutionality, supra note 102, at 341-42; see also Foulds, 171 F .3d at 29 1 n.20 ("Our
early legisla tors adopted the qui tam concept from the English system .").
104. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729- 3733 (1994).
105. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994).
106. S ee id. § 3730(a).
107. Id. § 3730(b)(1). A private plaintiff may not sue under the Act "based upon"
allegations or transactions that have been publicly disclosed (as such disclosure is
defin ed in the Act) unless she "is an original source of the information." Id. §
3730(e)(4)(A) (1994); see, e.g., United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomms.,
Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 938-43 (6th Cir. 1997) (surveying interpretations of the "based upon"
and "original source" requirements).
108. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B) (1994).
109. If the United States chooses not to intervene, the qui tam plaintiff receives "not
less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or
settlement," plus "reasonable" expenses, attorneys' fees and costs. Id. § 3730(d)(2). If
the United States intervenes, the qui tam plaintiff's cut of the proceeds decreases to "at
least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent;" and in certain circumstances if the
United States intervenes and the court finds that the action was based primarily on
information not provided by the qui tam plaintiff, the latter's share of the proceeds will
be 10 percent or less. !d. § 3730(d)( 1).
llO. United States ex rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154 F .3d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 1998);
United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A , Inc., 39 F .3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 1994);
United States ex rel. Berge v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama, 104 F.3d 1453,
1458 (4th Cir. 1997); United States ex rel . Milam v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson
Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 50 (4th Cir. 1992).
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of any recovery. "111 And in addition to being the nominal
plaintiff, the United States retains a certain amount of control
over the conduct of the action:
If it wishes to intervene in the action at th e outset , the qui tam
plaintiff cannot prevent it from doing so. Whether or not the
government interven es, it has the right to be kept abreast of
discovery in the qui tam s uit and th e right to prevent that
discovery from interfering with its investigat ion or pursuit of a
criminal or civil suit arising out of the same facts. If the
government interven es, it t akes control of the lawsuit; it may have
the participation of the qui tam plaintiff limited; and it is not
bound by any act of the qui tam plaintiff. The government has
both the right to prevent a dismissal sought by the qui tam
plaintiff and the right to cause the action to be dismissed for any
rational governmental reason, notwithstanding the qui tam
plaintiffs desire that it continue.11 2

But while Alden's analysis r equires courts to assess whether
and to what extent the federal government controls an action
against a state, the Court is likely to be more interested in types
of control that hold the promise of benefits to the state
defendant, or at least of checks on the qui tam plaintiffs zeal.
Specifically, by linking the requirement of federal "control" of
suits against states to "the exercise of political responsibility for
[the] suit," 113 Alden suggests that the key feature of the relevant
control is that it enables the United States to moderate its
litigation stance in response to political pressures. This goal, of
course, appears to conflict with the aims of the qui tam
provisions of the False Claims Act, to the extent those provisions
arise from a concern that "[g]overnment agencies may be
sufficiently dependent upon (or co-opted by) specific
players .. . that the desire to prosecute wrongdoers diligently is
compromised." 114 Moreover, it is not intuitively obvious that the
Executive's duty to "take [c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully
executed" should require the Executive to give weight to a
potential defendant's interests when formulating the United
States' litigation positions. In the case of state defendants,
however, the Court appears to view such consideration of state
111. United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162
F .3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1998).
112. Id. at 202-03 .
113. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
114. Caminker, Constitutionality, supra note 102, at 351 (discussing possibility of
co-option by "players in the military-industrial complex").
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interests not as a danger but rather as a salutary exercise in
political accountability. The United States' influence over a
relator's prosecution of a qui tam suit, then, must be assessed by
reference to the federal government's ability to curtail the
claims against the state.
Measured by t his yardstick, many elements of the control
detailed above are either illusory or else irrelevant.
For
example, the United States' right to intervene in the action is
not unlimited, 115 and in any event that right is, by definition,
academic in cases where the United States never chooses to
intervene. Likewise, the fact that the United States, if it
intervenes, "shall not be bound by an act of the person bringing
the action" 116 seems more suited to the elimination of defenses
such as waiver or estoppel than to protecting the rights of the
state. 117 Many of the prerogatives reserved to the United States
when it chooses not to intervene are also inapposite to the state
sovereign immunity inquiry. For instance, the United States'
right to 'keep abreast' of discovery in the qui tam action by
receiving copies of all pleadings and deposition transcripts 118 is
more likely to assist the United States in pressing related claims
in other fora-p ossibly against the state-than it is to further
the interests of the state defendant. Likewise, the requirement
that the govemment consent to the dismissal of a qui tam
action11 9 offers little apparent benefit to a state defendant.l 20
115. If the government changes its mind after having chosen at the outset of the
case not to intervene, it must show "good cause" in order to intervene at a later point in
the case. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (1994).
116. Id. § 3730(c)(1).
117. Cf Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917) ("As a
general rule laches or neglect of duty on the part of officers of the [Federal] Govemment
is no defense to a suit by it to enforce a public right or protect a public interest.").
118. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (1994).
119. See id. § 3730(b)(1) ("The action may be dismissed only if the court and the
Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for
consenting."); compare Searcy v. Philips Elecs. North Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 158-59
(5th Cir. 1997) (Attomey General's consent to voluntary dismissal is required even if
United States has decided not to intervene); United States ex rel. McGough v. Covington
Techs. Co., 967 F.2d 1391, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the same), with United States ex
rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 724 (9th Cir. 1994) (where federal
government declines to intervene, it "may not obstruct the settlement and force a qui
tam plaintiff to continue litigation," but it may obtain a hearing to "question the
settlement for good cause," as where "a qui tam plaintiff and defendant ... artificially
structur[e] a settlement to deny the government its proper share of the settlement
proceeds"); Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (holding
that § 3730(b)(l) "applies only in cases where a plaintiff seeks voluntary dismissal of a
claim or action ... and not where the court orders dismissal").
120. Section 3730(b)(l)'s requirement of written consent by both the court and the
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V.lhen one looks only to the ways in which the federal
government's control over a qui tam action can safeguard a
state's interests, the rights granted to the United States when it
chooses not to intervene in t he action are somewhat more
lin1ited; bu t they are nonetheless significant. The United States
can seek dismissal of the action over the obj ection of the qui tam
relator, though only after the relator receives notice and a
hearing on the government's motion to dismiss.l 21
This
provision for judicial review may render the United States'

Attorney General theore tically might h elp to prevent a vexatious qui tam plaintiff from
dismissing and then refiling litigation for improper purposes. Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides simila r protection, but may not apply to a dismissal of
a qui tam action. See FED. R. Crv . P . 41(a) (after defendant's service of either an answer
or a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff m ay dismiss its claims only by leave of
comt or by stipulation signed by all parties that have a ppeared); FED. R. Crv. P. 41(a)(1)
(provisions for dismissal by stipulation are "[s]ubject to the provisions of ... any statute
of the United States"); cf United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece
Packing Corp., 151 F .3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998) (in False Claims Act qui tam suit,
Rule 41-which "protects defendants from vexatious plaintiffs"-does not apply to "the
dismissal decision of the real party in interest, the government, under a specific statute
establishing unique relationships among the parties"), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 794 (1999).
121. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (1994). There is some question as to whether §
3730(c)(2) applies to actions in which the United States chooses not to intervene, since
that provision specifies limitations on the rights of the qui tam relator in the event that
the United States does intervene. S ee id. § 3730(c)(1) ("If the Government proceeds with
the action" the qui tam relator "shall h ave the right to continue as a party to the action,
subject to the lin1itations set forth in paragraph (2)."). By contrast, if the United States
elects not to intervene initially, the Act provides that the court may "permit the
Government to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause" but such
permission must not "limit[] the status and rights of the person initiating the action."
Id. § 3730(c)(3).
Arguably, since "it would severely 'limit the status and rights' of the qui tam
relator if the DOJ later intervened and dismissed or settled the suit .. . unless the DOJ
initially intervenes during the 60-day period, it loses all power to dismiss or settle the
suit ... ." James T. Blanch, Note, The Constitutionality of the False Claims Act's Qui
Tam Provision, 16 HA.Rv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 701, 708 (1993). One court, however, has
reasoned that to "assume that the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act were
intended to curtail the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General" would "raise
serious constitutional questions. " Juliano v. Federal Asset Disposition Ass'n, 736 F.
Supp. 348, 351 (D.D.C. 1990), affd mem., 959 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that
the United States could move for dismissal of some of a qui tam relator's claims at the
outset of the litigation without first seeking to intervene in the action); see also United
States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 753 n.10 (9th Cir. 1993) (approving the
Juliano Court's interpretation as "an illustration of the meaningful control which the
Executive Branch can exercise over qui tam actions"). The same analysis should apply
to allow the United States to seek dismissal at a later time, rather than at the start of
the litigation. Thus, the United States, as intervenor, has been allowed to seek
dismissal of a qui tam suit under § 3730(c)(2)(A), even though the intervention did not
occur at the outset of the suit. See Sequoia Orange Co., 151 F.3d at 1145 ("Nothing in§
3730(c)(2)(A) purports to limit the government's dismissal a uthority based upon the
manner of intervention.").
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ability to dismiss qui tam suits somewhat more fz;rm al, and
perhaps less suited t o the accommodation of political concerns,
than the Court envisioned 'Nhen it wrote of suits "under the
control of responsible federal officers." 122 On the other hand, it
appears u nlikely that cour ts will require more than a rational
basis for the government's motion to dismiss. 123 Likewise, the
req uirement that the court hold a fairness hearing on any
settlement entered into by the government over the objections of
the relator should not prove too daunting an obstacle, especially
since t he hearing may be he1d in camera if necessa:ry.124 On
balance, then, the structure of qui tam suits unde:r the F a lse
Claims Act may provide the United States with sufficient
control that the conduct of the suits "Will not be guided solely by
the private interests of the relator, untempered by political
accountability.
However, the ability to im plement policies based on political
accountability may mean little if t he accountability itself n ever
materializes.
VVhile the United States likely can exercise
significant influence in favor of the state defendant in a qui t a m
suit, it is less apparent that the United States >Nill have a
motive to do so. Although the United States is a nominal
plaintiff in such a suit, it can potentially- if it chooses not to
intervene-disclaim r esponsibility for the relator's actions in
bringing and maintaining the suit. 125 At least in the minds of
members of the public at large, the government is less likely to
seem responsible for failing to put a stop to a qui tam suit by a
private individual than for bringing suit itself. Likewise, some
have argued that the absence of the federal government from
qui tam suits "prevents congresspersons from fulfilling their

122. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 785 (1991).
123. See United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162
F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Sequoia Orange Co. , 151 F.3d at 1145 , for
proposition that "in light of Separation of Powers concerns, district court need find only
that the government's decision to dismiss a qui tam suit, even a meritorious one, is
supported by a 'valid governmental purpose' that is not arbitrary or irrational a nd has
some 'rational relation' to the dismissal"); but see Stevens, 162 F.3d at 223 (Weinstein, J.,
dissenting) (referring to a case "in which qui tam provisions permitted a relator to force a
suit that the Department of Justice would have chosen not to pursue if the exercise of its
prosecutorial discretion had not been undermined").
124. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (1994) (government may settle over relator's
objections "if the court determines, after a hearing, that the proposed settlement is fair,
adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances").
125. See United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d
870, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (arguing that qui tam arrangement would permit the United
States to "remov[e] itself from direct accountability" for the suit).

RAISif,JG ARIZO~NA

2000
·-·1-n+·os l· ._u. ,

bvet v·~

;,!.:...,n··l -:- _.""'\· . . ·-r~-r~
-- L.,n -:-··r'·-, .:3, ·-l·~~r1o-:.···":l: -~ vn·uc.l'n--nel1+ """"' r.~d
Y> Jl, _
L .J.v ~ "- ··' '--.i<e<~ b'-' Y'-' "- L .. · v CL1. .c

'~d::i}'L'oG.:J

131
1·-,[·
..-.-~el. . 0·:~ l· ·.n
l~ .;:;_._ .._ , _ .._.;:, --'-'·

the cooperative relationships betvveen state agencies and thei:r
federal counterparts. "126 In this view, by allowing suits to
proceed in t he a bsence of the federal government, t he qui tam
system "effectively sh ort circuits the moderating processes
afforded
eong-.resspersons
and
state
and
:federal
127
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Finally, qui tarn suits are by nature antithetical to Alden's
goal of forcing the government to set priorities among its claims
again st states. As the Court is well aware, the United States
lacks the resm.u'Ces to htigate every state violation of a federal
r ight.1 28 Th us, the United States' decision to litigate a particular
claim reflects, in the vi ew of t he Alden Court, a determination
that the case is important enough, compared to other potential
litigation, to vvarrant action by the federal government. 129 The
qu~ tam suit, by cont rast, serves the opposite goal, 130 fo r it
0~

.t - ....

i,..J_

!.1 \.. -

126_ Stevens, 162 F .3d at 219 (Weinstein, J., dissenting)_
127. Id. at 225; see also id. (arguing that the "process by which federal
represen tatives seek to influence t h e administrative discretion of the executive branch
on behalf of their constituents, sometimes described as 'casework,' has become an
integral part of American fed eralism" )_ The force of this argument is open to question;
Professor Caminker challenges Judge Weinstein's analysis as "highly speculative."
Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 123-24 (noting that "[s]tates (and
t h eir congressional representatives) do sometimes influence fed eral regulatory policy,"
but arguing that "escaping from erstwhile legal liability [is] a more dubious prospect").
128. See, e.g, Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2292-93 (1999) (Souter, J., joined by
Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Night and Day:
Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in
Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1, 14 (1998) ("In a world of limited
governmental resources," to require that only the United States can sue states for
violations of federal law "means that some significant portion of such violations will go
uncorrected."); cf, e.g., Employees of Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of
Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 297 n.12 (1973) (Marshall, J., joined by Stewart,
J., concurring in result) (noting that "[i]t is obviously unrealistic to expect Government
enforcement alone to be sufficient" to implement the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act).
129. Even if the Court is correct that such prioritization by the United States will
generally lead the government to sue on the most important claims, presumably in some
instances a rule against suits by private qui tam relators will lead to underenforcement.
See Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 120 n. 128 (noting that
"[t]here might be some suits that only a private relator but not an executive official
would pursue (for example, wh ere the suit seems meritorious but the gains too small to
justifY the deployment of scarce public resources)"); id. at 122 ("Congress's rationale for
revitalizing the False Claims Act's qui tam provisions was that the executive branch by
itself was underenforcing federal law because it lacked the resources to detect violations
or prosecute them once detected.").
130. See United States ex rel. Milam v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer
Ctr. , 96 1 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 1992) (by providing for qui tam suits, Congress "gave the
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enables private parties to prosecute claims th::-rt th·2 g·Dve:rn'Xtf,nt
conclud:2s it lacks t h e resources or the desire to press itseJf l:E
1 .
' 11•J:' th
.
- . 1- • nc . ' •k "
tt
rl n d eed,
1 e qw tam plmn·..,nl 1s lL e an a o:rney w oTKln g :wr a
contingent fee," 13 2 she seems to be a lawyer withou t a client. 13:3
Unlike a client, the United States is not a party t o the qui tarn
suit, a nd thus is su bj ect neither t o the discovery rules governin;::;·
parties, 134 n or to the d isciplinary author it y of the court, n or tc1
,.,
.. .c10T cos,~s
4
•
nam.1n.y
or a·t)c.orneys· rees. ls-;:) .I n surn , .Ll
~.,ne quL tam
provisions give the U nited States many of the b enefit s of
bringing a claim while permit ting it to evade t h e bun1ens and
r espon sibilit ies of litigation.
Th us, qui tam suits against states in which t h e United
States chooses not to intervene fall close to the line sketched bv
..
~

'

f"

;

Executive Branch the option to allocate its resources elsewh ere").
131. A requirement that the United States itself press the claim would, of course,
decrease dramatically the absolute number of damages suits brought against states.
Presum ably, this effect is not in itself a functional justification for the Alden Court's
rule. S ee Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 120 (noting tha t "an
executive form requirement cannot persuasively be justified merely because it would
likely lead to fewer suits being filed against states"). To the members of the Alden
majority, however, such an effect might accord with an originalist view of the sta t es'
consent, in the constitutional plan, to suit by the United States. If the Court adher es t o
the view that this consent arose from the desire to avoid feder al r esort to "extralegal
m easures ," Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 , then the Court might also posit that the sta tes
consented to such suits only to the extent necessary to avoid armed conflicts with th e
United States-a limitation that might map fairly closely onto the small subset of
United States claims that the federal government elects to litigate itself.
132. United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162
F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1998).
133. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, while "an attorney owes important fiduciary
duties to his client," no such duty "prevents the qui tam plaintiff from furthering his own
interests to the detriment of the United States' interests." United States ex rel. Foulds v.
Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 290 n.18. (5th Cir. 1999).
134. See United States ex rel. Farrell v. SKF, USA, Inc., 32 F. Supp.2d 617, 617-19
(W.D.N.Y. 1999) (in qui tam suit in which United States has chosen not to intervene,
United States is not "a litigating party subject to the discovery rules"). As a practical
matter, the United States' absence may not always disadvantage the defendant in terms
of discovery. See John T. Boese, The Science and Art of Defending a Civil False Claims
Act Case Brought by a Qui Tam Relator, A.B.A. WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1997, N97WCCB
ABA-LGLED I-1, at *I-15 (1997) (arguing that if the United States chooses not to
intervene, defense counsel can seek information from the United States through
informal discovery methods that "are an enormous source of cheaper, easier and many
times far more useful discovery than formal depositions") .
135. See United States ex rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154 F.3d 865, 869 (8th Cir.
1998) (Panner, J., dissenting) ("Unless it intervenes, the United States is not liable for
any costs or attorney fees awarded to the defendants. "); cf 31 U.S.C . § 3730(g) (1994)
("In civil actions brought under this section by the United States, the provisions of
section 2412(d) of title 28 shall apply."); 28 U.S .C. § 2412(d) (1994) (providing that in a
civil action brought by or against the United States a "prevailing party" may, if it m eet s
certain requirements, recover "fees and other expenses" from the United States).
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the Alden Court aroun.d state sovereign immunity. To be sure,
such suits arise from injury t o, and seek r ecovery for, t h e United
States, and the governm ent retains some degree of control over
their conduct. But such suits conspicuously violate the Alden
Court's rule "that the National Government must itself deem
t he case of sufficient importance to take action against t h e
State." 136 By contra st, Arizona int ervention-as will become
clear from the description that follows-suffers from no such
defect.
III .ARIZONA AND SUBSEQUENT CASES

In approving the tribal litigants' intervention in _Arizona v.
California, 137 the Court did not discuss whether the Constitution
requires that the United States retain any particular degree of
influence or control over the prosecution of the claims against
the states. However, Arizona's facts , procedural history and
holding indicate that tribal intervention does not offend state
immunity, even wher e the tribal litigant makes different
arguments, and seeks more extensive relief, than does the
United States. In this section, I summarize relevant aspects of
the Arizona case, and then examine whether Arizona's holding
is still good law.

A. Arizona
The Arizona litigation began in 1952 when Arizona brought
an original proceeding against California in the Supreme Court
to confirm Arizona's title to, and limit California's use of, the
waters of the lower Colorado River.l 38 Nevada intervened to
seek a determination of its water rights, and Utah and New
Mexico were joined as defendants.l 39 The United States then
intervened to assert water rights on behalf of various federal
"establishments," including the reservations of five Indian tribes
(the "Tribes") .140

136. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269; see also Foulds, 171 F.3d at 293-94 ("Unless the
United States commits its own resources-both personnel and money that are under its
authority and control-private citizens should not be able to sidestep the Eleventh
Amendment and hail the sovereign states into federal court.").
137. 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
138. See id. at 608.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 608-09.
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and supplemented in 1979, 143 the Sup-reme Court created a
system to alloca te water rights among the litigants. The decrees
apportioned certain amounts of water to each of Arizona,
Californi a and Nevada and required the United St a tes, which
controlled the flow of water in t h e relevant portion of the
Colorado River, to follow a particular order of priority in
distributing it.l 44 In the event of a water shortage, the United
States was required to provide t he five Tribes with their full
annual allotment of water before providing water to the three
sta tes. 145
Prior to the entry of the 1979 decree, the Tribes moved to
intervene to assert new claims to additional water righ t s
appurtenant t o lands they claimed should be cou nted as part of
their respective reservations.l 46 Not on ly had the United States
not asserted those claims, but it even in itially opposed the
Tribes' intervention- though it eventually joined the Tribes in
claiming additional water rights.l 47 Ivieanwhile, the Court in
1979 disposed of all the other issues in the case and referred t h e
int ervention motions 148 to a Special Master.1 49
By the time that the Special Master ruled on the Tribes'
l..
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141. See Arizona v. California, 376 U.S . 340 (1964).
142. See Arizona v. California, 383 U.S. 268 (1966).
143. See Arizona v. California, 439 U.S . 419 (1979).
144. See Arizona , 376 U.S. at 340-46.
145. S ee Arizona v. California, 460 U .S. 605, 611 (1983). The 1979 decree
enumerated a limited number of specific properties in Arizona and California, the water
rights of which could be satisfied before those of the Tribes. See Arizona, 439 U .S. at
421.
146. S ee Arizona, 460 U .S. at 612.
147. See id.
148. Three of the Tribes had also sought to interven e to oppose entry of the Court's
1979 decree setting the order of priority of the water rights; the Court refused to grant
them leave to intervene for this purpose. S ee id. Since the parties had been litigating
the order of priority since the late 1960s, see, e.g. , Arizona, 439 U .S. at 424 n.3
(discussing Arizona's 1967 submission), and the intervention motion was not made until
1977 at the earliest, see 460 U .S. at 612, it seems likely that the Court's refusal to grant
intervention as to the subject matter of the 1979 decree stemmed from the belated
nature of the application. See Arizona, 460 U.S. at 615 (granting motions to intervene
with respect to new issues because "[t)he Tribes' motions to intervene are sufficiently
timely with respect to this phase of the litigation" (emphasis added)); cf FED. R. Crv. P.
24 (requiring that applications to intervene in district court proceedings be "timely");
Arizona, 460 U.S. at 614 (noting that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a
guide to procedure in original actions before the Court).
149. Special Master Elbert P . Tuttle h ad been appointed to the federal bench in
1954. At the time of his involvement in the A rizona case he was a Senior Circuit Judge
on the Fifth Circuit-and then the Eleventh Circuit-Court of Appeals.
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which depen d the present perfected righ ts of -which the Tribes
are the beneficial owners."150 The states vigorously opposed
inte.i:vention, contending that the Tribes' interest s were
adequately r epresented by the United States 151 an d th at t ribal
intervention without the states' consent would violate their
Eleventh Amendment ixnmunityJ52
The Special Master r ejected some of the Tribes' arguments
as to the inadequacy of the United Stat es' r epresent ation,l53
reasoning that the U n it ed States could n ot be held t o the same
conflicts standar ds as an or dinary fidu cia:ry.154 But the Special
Iv'Iaster noneth eless found significant differences between the
Tr ibes' interests and those of the United States, most
importantly that "in their pleadings, the U nited St a t es and the
Tribes claim significantly different amount s of irrigable
acreage," with the result that "[t] o the extent of t hese differences
t he Indian claims are not actually r epresented" by the United
States.1 55 More generally, the Special Mast er r easoned that "[i] n
its representation of the Tribes , though it must r easonably fulfill
the nation's trust obligations or face the prospect of liability for
their breach, the United States also acts on considerations of
Indian policy or other national concerns which may yield a
different litigation position than the r epresented Tribes
themselves would reach." 156 Finally, although the Special
1

r

'

150. Mem. and Report on Prelim. Issues [hereinafter Special Master Report] at 6-7,
Arizona (Aug. 28, 1979).
151. See id at 8. Arizona opposed any sort of tribal intervention whatsoever, see id.;
California, Nevada and Utah were willing to consent to intervention only on certain
conditions, including that the tribes be represented only by their own counsel and no
longer by the United States, and that the tribes be allowed to assert only certain kinds of
claims (those for water rights appurtenant to acreage outside the reservation boundaries
as conceded by the United States for purposes of the 1964 decree) and not other kinds of
claims (those for acreage within the boundaries conceded for the 1964 decree but not
claimed by the United States prior to the 1964 decree), see id. at 2, 18.
152. See id. at 18.
153. The Tribes contended that the United States had conflicted loyalties springing
from its interests on behalf of other federal establishments and its involvement in the
management of the river system; moreover, they pointed out that the United States had
already failed the Tribes by omitting to present initially the claims which the Tribes now
sought to assert. The Special Master rejected these arguments on the basis that,
whatever may have gone before, they did not raise concerns as to the United States'
current ability to discharge its duties to the Tribes. See id. at 9-10.
154. See generally id. at 10 n.18.
155. Id. at 11.
156. Special Master Report, supra note 150, at 11-12 (footnotes omitted).
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he held that the .Amendment was no b ar to intervention by the
Tribes .158
Not surprisingly, the exceptions filed by the states in the
Supreme Court included an objection to the Tribes' intervention.
'I'hc
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t hat because "[t]he Tribes d o not seek to bring new claims or
issues against the states, but only ask leave t o participate in an
adjudication of their vital water rights that was commenced by
the United States ," the Court's "judicial power over the
controversy is not enlar ged by granting leave to intervene, and
the States' sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh
Amendment is not compromised." 159
The Court's terse holding is illuminated perhaps less by its
words than by what went unsaid, for the Court eschewed each of
the Special lVIaster's three rationales. First, the Court, unlike
the Special Master, 160 did not invoke the concept that the Tribes'
claims were "ancillary" to the main proceeding before it. Indeed,
such a view would have run contrary to the Court's own
assessment of the case, which made clear that the proceeding in
which the Tribes sought to intervene was new, self-contained,
and separate from the previously-resolved disputes:
_c:c\ r.i.a. ~
1 ·~'-''"''·
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The 1979 Decree . .. resolved outstanding issues in the litigation.
But before that Decree was entered new questions arose: The five
Indian Tribes, ultimately joined by the United States, made claims
for additional water rights to Reservation lands. 161

The Court may also have found the ancillary jurisdiction
rationale doctrinally unpersuasive.
Only a year later, in
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 162 it would
hold that pendent jurisdiction did not override the Eleventh
157. Id. at 17; see also id. n.30 .
158. See id. at 16-30.
159. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614 (1983). The Court, like the Special
Master, assumed for the sake of argument "that a State may interpose its immunity to
bar a suit brought against it by an Indian tribe." Id.
160. The Special Master maintained that because the Tribes' "claims as intervenors
are ancillary to a case or controversy ... within the federal judicial power and already
before the Court," intervention "is therefore within the scope of the States' constitutional
surrender of immunity." Special Master Report, supra note 150, at 18; see also id. at 2024.
161. Arizona, 460 U.S. at 611.
162. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
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.f-\_mendment with respect to state-law claims. 163
Second, the Court rightly ignored the Special Iviaster's
argument that the relief sought by the Tribes would :not "run
against t h e States," 164 for such plainly was not the case. Since
the Tribes' allocations were the first to be fulfill ed in the event of
a vvater sh ortage, the increased water rights won by the Tribes
operated directly to decrease the water rights of the states:rights that those states had asserted throughout decades of
litigation. Admittedly, the relief sought by the Tribes would not
necessarily alter the allocation of water among the states; but it
would "require a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount of
water available" to states and other non-Indian users as a
group .l 65 T hird, the Court disregarded the Special Master's
argument that Congress had abrogated the states' immunity in
enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1362 166-a rationale that the Court would
later reject in Blatchford.l 67
The Court's holding, moreover, is informed not only by the
arguments the Court rej ected but also by the facts of which it
must have been aware. The Special Master's Preliminary
Report made clear that the Tribes sought greater relief than did
the United States 168-indeed, that conclusion was among the
primary reasons the Special Master permitted the Tribes to
intervene. 169 The Special Master, however, viewed the Tribes
not as "rais[ing] new claims," but rather as seeking merely "to

163. See id. at 121.
164. The Special Master wrote that "[t]he Tribes do not now seek to present new
claims against the States which will alter the allocation of water among the States as
determined by the Supreme Court .. . nor do they seek relief which will run against the
States." Special Master Report, supra note 150, at 19.
165. Arizona v. Califomia, 460 U.S. 605, 621 (1983).
166. See Special Master Report, supra note 150, at 25-30. Section 1362, which
provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions,
brought by any [federally recognized] Indian tribe or band .. . wherein the matter in
controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," 28
U.S.C. § 1362 (1994), was intended "to open the federal courts to the kind of claims that
could have been brought by the United States as trustee, but for whatever reason were
not so brought," Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 472
(1976).
167. See Blatchford v. Native Village ofNoatak, 501 U .S. 775, 788 (1991).
168. See Special Master Report, supra note 150, at 11. The extent of the Tribes'
water rights depended on the irrigable acreage within their reservations. The Special
Master specifically noted that "[w]ith one exception, the total irrigable acreage which the
United States claims for each reservation ... differs significantly from that claimed by
the Tribes on their own behalfs," in all but one instance because the Tribes claimed
greater acreage than did the United States. Id. at 3 & n.6.
169. See id. at 11.
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quantify existing rights already presented by the United States
and determined by the Court." 170 Hence when the Court
adopted the view that the Tribes did not seek to bring "new
claims or issues" against the states, it was not referring to an
absence of quantitative differences in the relief requested.
Thus, Arizona demonstrates that Indian t ribes can
intervene in actions litigated by th e United States-without
offending st ate sovereign immunity-even if the tribes seek
relief that is quantitatively more extensive than that requested
by the United States.

B. Later Cases
Despite its recent flurry of decisions favoring state
sovereign immunity, the Court has not retreated from its
h olding in Arizona. In particular, the Court's decisions in
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. H alderman 171 and in
Idaho u. Coeur d'Alene Tribe 172 do not affect t he Arizona
doctrine; and though the Court's recent decision in Jldinnesota u.
Mille Lacs Band 173 provided an opportunity to revisit Arizona,
the Court did not do so.
Though at first glance the Court's discussion in Pennhurst
of pendent jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment might
seem relevant to Arizona intervention, closer inspection shows
Pennhurst to be inapposite. In Pennhurst, the Court held that
pendent jurisdiction cannot override a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity with respect to an individual's state-law
claim, and that therefore the Eleventh Amendment barred the
award of injunctive relief to private plaintiffs, under a state law,
against state officials.1 74 The Court explained that "[a] federal
court must examine each claim in a case to see if the court's
jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment" 175 and noted that "[a]lthough the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar the United States from suing a State
in federal court, the United States' presence in the case for any
purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 13.
465 u.s. 89 (1984).
521 u.s. 261 (1997).
119 S. Ct. 1187 (1999).
See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 124-25.
Id. at 121.
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purposes." 176 Thus, although the United States had intervened
as a plaintiff, 177 the Court held that because the United States
lacked standing "to assert the state-law claims of third-parties"
its presence did not affect the application of the Eleventh
Amendment to such claims.17s
Pennhurst's holding has no bearing on Arizona, for the
Court in Arizona did not rely on the concept that the proceeding
in question was ancillary to t he litigation that had gone
before.1 79 Moreover, the United States clearly has standing t o
assert federal claims on behalf of Indian tribes pursuant to its
trust obligations, 180 and thus the Pennhurst scenario-where the
U nited States had no sta nding to assert individuals' state-law
claims-has no application. l SI
Similarly, nothing in Coeur d'Alene Tribe undermines
Arizona. In Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the Court held t hat the
Eleventh Amendment barred t he Tribe's claims for declaratory
and injunctive relief against state officials concerning the Tribe's
asserted beneficial interest in certain lands and waters.1 82 Mter
the district court dismissed the Tribe's claims, the United States
filed a separate suit against the state on the Tribe's behalf,
seeking to quiet title to about a third of the land at issue in the
Tribe's action.1 83 None of the parties contended, and the Court
did not suggest, that the United States' separate and
subsequent suit had any relevance to the sovereign immunity
question before the Court; indeed, the Court noted that the
government's suit was "not implicated" in the case before it.l 84
Though a closer question might have been presented had the

176. Id. at 103 n.12 (citation omitted).
177. See id. at 96 n.5.
178. Id. at 103 n.12.
179. See Part liLA. above.
180. See Part IV.A.2. below.
181. Thus, the holding of Pennhurst belies the D.C. Circuit's suggestion in United
States ex rel. Long u. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 885 (D.C. Cir.
1999), that under Pennhurst states retain their sovereign immunity to a private
plaintiffs federal claim even if the United States intervenes to assert the same claim.
See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, Nos. 80-CV-930 & 80-CV-960, 1999 WL 509442, at
*14 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 1999) (holding that Arizona, and not Pennhurst, applies where the
United States has intervened and "is seeking to enforce the [tribal plaintiffs'] federal
rights") .
182. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 264-65, 287-88.
183. See id. at 266.
184. ld.; see also Petitioner's Brief at 6-7, Coeur d'Alene Tribe (1996 WL 290997);
Respondent's Brief at 4, Coeur d'Alene Tribe (1996 WL 380391); Reply Brief at 10-11,
Coeur d'Alene Tribe (1996 WL 439249).
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Tr ibe sought to consolidate its case with the government's
action, it had no such opportunity in Coeur d'Alene Tribe since
the government did not sue until after t he Tribe's suit was
dismissed. Thus, Coeur d'Alene Tribe, at most, indicates an
unwillingness to extend the Arizona rationale beyond claims
brought in the same suit by a tribe and the fede ral governmen t.
Likewise, the Court could have revisited the Arizona issu e
in Mille Lacs Band, but it chose not to. In M ille Lacs Band , the
Eighth Circuit held under Arizona that the United States'
presence as a plaintiff-intervenor removed any st ate sovereign
immunity to the Mille Lacs Band's claims. 185 Mter the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, the state defendant s br iefed t he
certified issues but did not question the lower courts' h oldings
on state sovereign immunity.l 86 Similarly, no mention was
made of state sovereign immunity at oral argumentl 87 and the
issue is absent from both the opinion for the Courtl 88 and the
dissent.l 89 Admittedly, the Court's affirmance of t he judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs does not indicate that it considered the
Eleventh Amendment issue, for under Wisconsin Department of
Corrections v. Schacht 190 if a state neglects to press its Eleventh
Amendment defense a court need not raise the defect on its
own. 191 Nonetheless, since a court can raise an Eleventh
Amendment issue sua sponte if it chooses, 192 the Court's silence
185. See Mille Lacs Band v. Minnesota, 124 F.3d 904, 913-14 (8th Cir. 1997), affd
on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 1187 (1999).
186. See Brief for the Petitioners, Mille Lacs Band (1998 WL 464932); Reply Brief
for the Petitioners, Mille Lacs Band (1998 WL 761906). The County defendants and an
amicus each submitted a brief obliquely criticizing Eleventh Amendment rulings by the
lower courts. See Brief of Respondent Counties in Support of Petitioner State of
Minnesota at 18, Mille Lacs Band (1998 WL 464930) ("The court's order enjoining the
State from enforcement of its conservation laws while requiring the State to restrict
other citizens is beyond a court's jurisdiction (and relief barred by the lOth and 11th
Amendments)."); Brief for the Citizens Equal Rights Alliance (CERA) as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 8, Mille Lacs Band (1998 WL 464928) ("Based on an original
jurisdiction decision, the Judge relied on an 1837 Treaty to defeat Eleventh Amendment
defenses to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."). However, neither brief highlighted the
issue.
187. See Transcript, Mille Lacs Band (1998 WL 849395).
188. See 119 S . Ct. 1187.
189. See id. at 1206 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting).
190. 118 S. Ct. 204 7 (1998) .
191. See id. at 2052.
192. See, e.g., Parella v. Retirement Bd., 173 F.3d 46, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1999); V-1 Oil
Co. v. Utah State Dep't of Public Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1420 (lOth Cir. 1997); Ysleta Del
Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1994). Although the Seventh Circuit
has stated that Schacht "ruled that a federal court must not raise a potential Eleventh
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su ggests that it continues to adh ere t o t h e holding in Arizona .
In sum, the Court's recent decisions h ave not questioned the
propriety of Arizona int ervention; but n either h ave they
commented upon it. Th us, furthe r inquiTy into the Cov.rt's likely
view of t he doctr ine must draw upon t h e Court's m ore gener al
a pproaches t o st ate sovereign immunity. In this regard, t h e
A lde n maj ority's focus on the nat ure of t he pla intiff seems
particularly pertinent.

IV . .A...RIZ ONA IN THE LIGHT OF A L DEN
As noted above, the Court's recent for m ulation of t he
concerns underlying state sovereign immunity may prom pt a
reevaluation of certain types of suits, su ch as qui tam actions in
which t h e United Sta t es does not intervene. But far from
bringing A rizona intervent ion into question , A lden's for mal
a pproach and its fu nctional an alysis provide su pport for tribal
par ticipation in United States suits again st stat es .

A. Arizona and the Formal Federalism Inquiry
The terseness of the A rizona opinion perhaps r eflected the
fact that the question of int ervention by Indian t r ibes in federal
government suits aga inst states is nowhere directly addressed
in the sources to which the Court customarily turns for guida nce
on issues of feder alism. 193 Thus , the discussion that follows does
not address all the sour ces on which t he Alden Court dr ew for
its formal analysis, for some of those-for instance English legal
precedents, and statements by the Framers and their
contemporaries-have no direct relevance to Arizona
intervention. Of the remaining topics treated in Alden's for mal
analysis, the Court's emphasis on stat e dignity, and its focus on
historical practices, seem most r elevant, and inquir ies along

Amendment issue sua sponte," Schacht v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 175 F. 3d 497,
501 (7th Cir. 1999), nothing in S chacht supports such a reading, see, e.g., Schacht, 118 S.
Ct . at 2052 ("Unless the State raises the matter, a court can ignore it" (emphasis
added).)_
193. Although the colonial er a provided some preceden t for the relationship among
th e n ew federal gover nment, the states and the In dian t ribes, see, e.g., Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U .S. 515, 547-48 (1832) (discussing the Regal Pr oclam a tion of Oct. 7, 1763,
which provided that colonial governors could not gra nt pa tents to India n la nds with out
the Crown's approval); see generally Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce
Clause , 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1064-98 (1995) (discussing colonial interactions wit h
Indian tribes), the traditional sources of federalism precepts are silent on t he particular
question of Arizona intervention.
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those lines indicate that Arizona is doctrinally sound.

1. State "dignity" and tribal suits
The Alden Court's recurrent references to state "dign.ity" 1 9 4
suggest that such a concept would figure in the Court's analysis
of t:cibal participation in suits by the United States. As an
initial matter, however, the question arises wh ether a concern
:for state "dignity" remains a valid consideration in state
sove:ceig-n immunity analysis . An abstract conception of state
dignity seems a hollmv basis for denying redress for state
violations of federal law; as the Alden dissenters argued, "[i]t
would be hard to imagine anything more inimical to the
republican conception, which rests on the understanding of its
citizens precisely that the government is not above them, but of
them, its actions being governed by law just like their own." 195
The Alden majority, though, appears to regard state "dignity'' as
a way of conceptualizing the reservation of certain rights and
powers to the states.
Dignity, in this perspective, is the
t ouchst one of the states' residuary sovereignty: "[t]hey are not
194. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2247 (1999) (states retain "a substantial
portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential
attributes inhering in that status"); id. (states "retain the dignity, though not the full
authority, of sovereignty"); id. (Framers "considered immunity from private suits central
to sovereign dignity"); id. at 2258 (a sovereign's immunity from suit in court of another
sovereign must arise either from an agreement between the two sovereigns, "or in the
voluntary decision of the second to respect the dignity of the first" (quoting Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416 (1979))); id. at 2263 (sovereign immunity is designed to protect
"the dignity and respect afforded a State" (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521
U.S. 261, 268 (1997))); id. at 2264 (discussing petitioners' contention "that immunity
from suit in federal court suffices to preserve the dignity of the States"); id. ("Private
suits against nonconsenting States ... present 'the indignity of subjecting a State to the
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties"' (quoting Ex parte
Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).).
195. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2289 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer,
JJ., dissenting); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The Sovereign Immunity
"Exception," 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 132 (1996) (questioning the viability of the dignity
rationale since "(t]he idea that a state, an utterly abstract entity, has feelings about
being sued by a private party ... surely strains credulity," and noting that the Court has
elsewhere ruled "that states serve as functional entities in the constitutional context")
(quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) ("The Constitution does
not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as
abstract political entities . . . . To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority
between federal and state government for the protection of individuals.")).
As well, one would think that those who favor rules over standards might
object to the Court's emphasis on the "dignity" of states as a basis for state immunity,
since such a concept seems so vague as to set no constraint on ad hoc decisionmaking.
Cf Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
rules are necessary to guard against ad hoc judgment).
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relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations,
but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of
sovereignty." 196 According to this view, the Court must honor
the Framers' references to state dignity by preserving certain
state prerogatives; 197 hence the Alden majority's argument that
"[t]he generation that designed and adopted our federal system
considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign
dignity." 198 For t he purposes of this Puticle, it is unnecessary to
decide whether either of these views of state dignity should play
a :role in sovereign immunity analysis, for tribal participation in
suit s brought by the United States remains justifiable, whether
the dignity concept is seen as a proxy for functional goals or as
an intrinsically important symbolic value.
Assuming that solicitude for state dignity is meant t o
prevent federal encroachment upon some state prerogatives,
those prerogatives do not include freedom from suits by the
United States to enforce federal law. In the view of the Court,
the states' consent to suit by the United States was necessary in
order t o ensure the supremacy of federal law 199 and to avoid

196. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2247. Similarly, the Court stated that the Constitution
"reserves to [the states] a substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty,
together with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status." I d.
197. See, e.g., id. at 2263 ("[O]ur federalism requires that Congress treat the States
in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants
in the governance of the Nation.").
198. Id. at 2247. Likewise, the Court appears to see state dignity as a protection
against federal commandeering: state courts should not be forced to hear federal claims
pressed by private plaintiffs against states, the Alden Court held, because that would
"denigrateD the separate sovereignty of the States." Id. at 2264. State dignity may also
be a shorthand for state autonomy; in arguing that private suits against states would
interfere with states' public policy decisions, the Alden Court warned of "substantial
costs to the autonomy, the decisionmaking ability, and the sovereign capacity of the
States." Id.
199. The supremacy of federal law requires that, in some respects at least, the
sovereignty of the states must give way to the will of the federal government, for the
contrary result would "inver[t] ... the fundamental principles of all government;" to
have "the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the
parts" would create "a monster, in which the head was under the direction of the
members." THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 99 (Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
Thus, "[t]he possibility of suits by the United States against the states is
essential to our federal system .... 'Unless this power were given to the United States,
the enforcement of all their rights, powers, contracts and privileges in all their sovereign
capacity would be at the mercy of the states."' United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d 195, 213-14 (2d Cir. 1998) (Weinstein, J.,
dissenting) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES§ 1674, at 445 (1851)); see also, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not
as Limits, but as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1219, 1219-20 (1997) (arguing that
though one aspect of federalism is "protecting states," "an equally-in fact, more-
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extralegal methods of dispute resolution among the sovereign
members of the federal system. 200 The Framers "could not have
overlooked the possibility that controversies capable of judicial
solution might arise between the United States and some of the
states," and "the permanence of the Union might be endangered
if to some t r ibunal was not intrusted the power to determine
t hem according to the recognized principles of law." 201
Accordingly, from a functio n al viewpoint, once a state is sued by
t he federal government, its dignity is not implicated simply
because in t he course of the suit it must also respond to
allegations by a non-federal intervenor. As the Court has noted,
"a suit brought against a State by the United States [is] a
situation in which state sovereign immunity does not exist." 202
Likewise, if the dignity concern is taken as a symbolic
value, it is no more persuasive, for such a consideration has no
application to suits by the United States and no resonance in the
context of suits by Indian tribes.
Revealingly, rhetoric
concerning state dignity has focused instead on suits by private
individuals. 203 Thus, the Court has argued that "[t]he very
object and purpose of the eleventh amendment were to prevent
the indignity of subjecting a state to the coercive process of
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties."204 As the
important aspect is protecting authority of the federal government"); cf Henry Paul
Monaghan, Comment, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARv. L. REV. 102, 122
(1996) (noting the tension between state sovereign immunity and "national
supremacy ... which generally presumes that Congress can entrust enforcement of
whatever rights it can validly create to the national courts").
200. For an altemative reconstruction of the intent of the Framers, see Caminker,
State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 110-11 (discussed supra at note 94).
201. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644-45 (1892). In Texas, the Court held
that since the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of suits between two states, it is also an
appropriate tribunal for suits by the United States against a state. It has since been
established that the United States can sue a state in the federal district courts, see, e.g.,
United States v. Califomia, 297 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1936).
202. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S.
Ct. 2219, 2228 n.3 (1999) (citing United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892)). More
specific functional concems that may arise during such a suit are addressed in Part
N.B. below.
203. Similarly, many discussions concerning state sovereign immunity focus
specifically on suits by private individuals; as Hamilton famously stated, "[i]t is inherent
in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent." THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (emphasis added; original emphasis omitted). In this
regard it is notable that, in surveying background principles of state sovereign
immunity, the majority opinion in Alden (and its quotes from other sources) referred well
over a dozen times to "private" suits or suits by "individuals." See Alden v. Maine, 119 S.
Ct. 2240, 2247-54, 2260-64 (1999).
204. Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment applies to a suit against a state attomey general when the state is the real
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Court has observed, "[t]he generation that designed and adopted
our system considered immunity from private suits central to
sovereign dignity." 205 During the debates on the Constitution,
on e of the main obj ections t o the extension of the judicial power
t o controversies between a state and citizens of another state
was that "it subj ects a state to answer in a court of law, to the
suit of an individual. This is humiliating and degrading to a
government, and, what I believe, the supreme authority of no
state ever submitted to."206
By contrast, claims brought against a state by the federal
government do not implicate the symbolic dignity rationale. The
Court first explicitly addressed the question of such suits in
United States v. Texas, an original action brought by the federal
government in the Supreme Court to establish the United
States' title to certain land claimed by the State of Texas. 207 In
finding jur isdiction over the action, the Court contrasted suits
by governments with suits by individuals:
[Previous cases] in this court relating to the suability of states,
proceeded upon the broad ground that 'it is inherent in the nature
of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent.'
The question as to the suability of one government by another
government rests upon wholly different grounds. Texas is not
called to the bar of this court at the suit of an individual, but at
the suit of the government established for the common and equal
benefit of the people of all the states. 2 08

The Court thus focused, not on the state's dignity concerns,
but on the fact that the constitutional plan must have
contemplated that the United States could sue states in federal
court.zog The only mention of state dignity in Texas comes in the
Court's explanation-of the statute granting the Supreme Court
exclusive jurisdiction over certain "controversies of a civil nature
where a state is a party"210-that "it best comported with the
party in interest); see also, e.g., Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U .S. 516, 527-28 (1899) (quoting
Ayers).
205. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2247.
206. "Brutus" XIII, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 222 , 223
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
207. 143 U.S. 621, 630-31 (1892).
208. Id. at 645-46.
209. See id. at 644-45.
210. The grant of exclusive jur isdiction applied to "all controversies of a civil nature,
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dignity of a state that a case in which it was a party should be
determined in the highest, rather than in a subordinate , judicial
tribunal of the nation." 211 This concern, however, is not of
constitutional magnitude, and it has since been well established
that the United States can sue a state in fede:ra1 district court
without offending the state's dignity.212
Because the relevant distinction, frorn the perspective of
symbolic state dignity, is bebNeen suits by individuals and suits
by governments, tribal suits raise no concerns .213 "Tribes .. . are
n ot private citizens, they are sovereig-.L1S. The affront to a state's
dignity by being hauled into court by another soveTeign is not of
the same order of magnitude as when the case involves a private
citizen (if there can be said to be an affront) ." 214 Alt hough the
Court held in Blatchford v. Native Village of f.Toatak t h at the
Eleventh Amendment extends to suits by Indian tribes , it did so
on t he basis that Indian tribes should be treated the same as
foreign nations for E leventh Amendment purposes. 215 Thus,
even in establishing state sovereign immunity to certain tribal
suits, the Court affirmed that "Indian tribes are sovereigns." 216
where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and except also between
a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80.
211. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643 (1892).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965) (noting
surprise "that the District Court entertained seriously the argument that the United
States could not constitutionally sue a State"); United States v. California, 297 U.S . 175,
188-89 (1936) (rejecting the argument "that Congress did not intend to subject a
sovereign state to the inconvenience and loss of dignity involved in a trial in a District
Court").
213. Cf Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 105 (noting that
"being haled into court by a 'mere' individual arguably poses a starker threat to a state's
dignity than being haled into court by a coequal or even superior sovereign").
214. Beth Prinz, Casenote, Expanding State Sovereignty: Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe of Idaho , 35 IDAHO L. REV. 599, 638 (1999).
215. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
216. Id. at 780. Under federal law, Indian tribes remain "unique aggregations
possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory."
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
509 (1991) (noting that Indian tribes "exercise inherent sovereign authority over their
members and territories").
Indeed, the federal government recently reaffirmed its commitment to
maintaining a "government-to-government" relationship with Indian tribes. See, e.g., 25
U.S.C . § 3601(1)-(2) (1994) (acknowledging the "government-to-government relationship
between the United States and each Indian tri be" and stating that the federal
government's trust responsibility "includes the protection of the sovereignty of each
tribal government"); White House Press Release, President Clinton: A Record of
Partnership with American Indians and Alaska Natives (Aug. 6, 1998) (found July 10,
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The
relevant
difference
betvveen
States
and
foreign
sovereigns ... is . .. the role of each in the convention within
which t he surrender of immunity was for the former, but not for
the latter, implicit.
\r{hat m akes the States' surrender of
immunity from suit by sister States pla usible is the mutuality of
that concession. There is no such mutuality with either foreign
sovereigns or Indian t ribes. 2 17

In Blatchford-as in Monaco u. lVJississippi, 'Where the Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment applies t o suits by foreign
sovereigns 218 --the Court made no mention of state dignity,
indicating that suits by tribal sovereigns implicate no such
concern. 2 19
1999 at <http://www.doi .gov/o ait/docs/bcl.htm>) (reviewing efforts by the Clinton
Administration "to establish a true government-to-government partnership" with Indian
nations); Department of Justice Policy on Indian Sovereignty and GDvernment-toGovernment Relations with Indian Tribes (unsigned, undated version found July 10,
1999 at <http://w-ww.usdoj.gov/otj/sovtrb.htmb); President's Memorandum for the Heads
of Executive Departments and Agencies, Government-to-Government Relations with
Native American Tribal Governments (April 29, 1994) (found July 31, 1999 at
<http://www.epa.gov/owindian/clinton.htm> ); see also McSloy, supra note 30, at 220 n.16
(citing earlier examples).
Moreover, on the same day in 1998 that the President issued an executive
order on "Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments," see Exec.
Order No. 13084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (1998), he also issued an executive order on
"Federalism," see Exec. Order No. 13083, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,651 (1998). The "Federalism"
order's provisions on federal-state relations parallel the "Consultation" order's precepts
regarding federal-tribal relations, and the "Consultation" order provides that it "shall
complement the consultation and waiver provisions in sections 4 and 5 of the Executive
order, entitled 'Federalism,' being issued on this day." 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 at Sec. 7(c).
Although in August 1999 the President issued a revised order on "Federalism" that
revoked Order No. 13083, see Exec. Order No. 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (1999), it is
suggestive that the two orders, as originally issued, presented the question of federal
relations with states in tandem with the question of federal relations with tribal
governments.
Similarly, though the states frequently dispute the legal implications of tribal
sovereignty, even they nonetheless acknowledge that it exists. See, e.g., Oregon Exec.
Order No. E0-96-30, State/Tribal Government-to-Government Relations (May 22, 1996)
(unsigned version found July 10, 1999 at <http://www.governor.state.or. us/governor/legal
/execords.htm> ); Jeffrey A. Modisett, Discovering the Impact of the "New Federalism" on
State Policy Makers: A State Attorney General's Perspective, 32 IND. L. REV. 141, 142
(1998) (article by Attorney General of Indiana, referring to "the competing sovereignties
of states, Indian tribes, and the federal government").
217. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782.
218. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934).
219. Alternatively, the Court's omission to mention state dignity-and the Court's
application of state sovereign immunity in cases brought by foreign nations and Indian
tribes-could signal a general decline in the influence of the dignity rationale. Cf
Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 105-06 (discussing Monaco and
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2. The federal government and Indian t.ribss
If the abstract notion of t ribal sovereignty help s explain
why Arizona intervention does not offend state dignity, the
historical placement of Indian tribes within the federal system
provides more specific support for the Arizona practice. In this
respect, the early relations between the federal government a nd
,.
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United States immediately assumed a trust responsibility for
the welfare of the tribes and with it both the ability to enforce
the tribes' rights against the states and the obligation to afford
the tribes a voice in the enforcement of those rights. Second, the
United States' early dealings with Indian tribes help to explain
why it was not until the 20th century that tribal intervention in
suits by the federal government became a significant issue.
"With the adoption of the Constitution, Indian r elations
became the exclusive province of federal law," 220 and the ne·w
Nation lost no time in exercising this authority. Under the
Articles of Confederation, certain states had attempted to
acquire large amounts of Indian land through "treaties" with
Indian tribes. 221
One of Congress's first acts after the
Constitution was to pass the In dian Trade and Intercourse Act
of 1790, one section of which (commonly known as the
Nonintercourse Act) provides
1

1

~

[t]hat no sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe
oflndians within the United States, shall be valid to any person or
persons, or to any state ... unless the same shall be made and
duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of
the United States.222

Blatchford and arguing that the "dignity-based distinction between individual and
sovereign plaintiffs has not withstood the test of time; during the past century the court
has made clear that the background immunity principle covers both categories, and
immunity waivers fall in both categories as well").
220. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985). As the
Court recently noted, "[i]f anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater
transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government than does the Interstate
Commerce Clause:" though the States "still exercise some authority over interstate
trade[, they] have been divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce and
Indian tribes." Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996).
221. At least one circuit court has concluded that the Articles of Confederation did
not prohibit such treaties. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1167
(2d Cir. 1988).
222. Act of July 22, 1790, § 4, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. Chap. 33, 1 Stat. 137, 138.
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en ter ed into by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. 224
From the earliest days of the Union, t h e federal
government's assumption of plenary respon sibility for Indian
relations created a trust relationship between the United States
and Indian tribes. 225
President VVashington explained the
Nonintercourse Act to a group of Seneca Indians in the following
terms:
.~

~

t~

P

'

Here, then, is the security for the remainder of you r lands. No
State, nor person, can purchase your lands, unless at some public
treaty, held under t he authority of the United States. The
General Government will not consent to your being defrauded, but
it will protect you in all your just rights.22 6

Decades later, Chief J ustice Mar shall would reaffirm the
United States' trust responsibility to Indian nations:
From the commencement of our government, congress has passed
acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which
treat them as nations , and manifest a firm purpose to afford that

223. See Act of March 1, 1793, 1 Stat. 329 (renewal); Act of May 19, 1796, 1 Stat.
469 (renewal); Act ofMarch 3, 1799, 1 Stat. 743 (renewal); Act of March 30, 1802,2 Stat.
139 (permanent enactment); Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729 (enacting statute in
substantially its current form), codified as carried forward at 25 U.S. C. § 177.
224. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 730 F. Supp. 485, 489 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
225. S ee, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). Of course, to recognize
the federal government's trust obligations is not to suggest that it always fulfilled them .
Arguably, the federal trust relationship manifests merely the softer side of the colonizing
power-the product of"an ambiguous heritage of'a conqueror with a conscience'." Philip
P. Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal
Indian Law, llO HA.Rv. L. REV. 1754, 1755 (1997) (quoting Frank Pommersheim, BRAID
OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 9 (1995)).
Moreover, the trust doctrine's effects on Native Americans have sometimes been far from
benign. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property , 86 Nw. U . L. REV. 1,
2 (1991) ("The federal government has often justified its coercive interference with the
property and sovereignty of American Indian nations by claiming to be acting in good
faith exercise of its trust r esponsibilities toward American Indians."). The problems
inherent in the federal trust doctrine, however, are beyond the scope of this Article; and
as far as the federal structure is concerned, dereliction on the part of the United States
diminishes neither its duties to Indian tribes nor its powers vis-a-vis the states.
226. The reply of the President of the United States to the speech of the
Cornplanter, Half-Town, and Great-Tree, Chiefs a nd Councillors of the Seneca nation of
Indians, December 29, 1790, 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 142 (Class II, Indian Affairs)
(Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832)
(emphasis added).
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protection which treaties stipulate.
(These acts] manifestly
consider the several Indian nations as distinct political
communities, having territori al boundaries, within which their
authority is exclusive, and having a right to all th e la nds within
those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied
by the United St ates. 227

Clearly, the United States assumed this t:rust responsibility
in the exercise of its sovereign powers. The Nonintercourse Act,
one of the federal government's earliest measures to protect the
rights of Indian tribes, is a law of general application that binds
the st at es and explicitly requires that land transactions with
Indian tribes be made only by federal treaty. Likewise, the
United States' trust obligations also arise from treaties with the
Indian tribes, into which the United States entered as a
sovereign-or rather, as the sovereign, for the United States is
the only non-native sovereign within this country's borders with
the constitutional capacity to treat with Indian nations. F inally,
the federal power to honor the trust includes the power to
enforce federal law against the states. Thus, for example, in
United States u. M innesota, 228 when the federal government
sued Minnesota to cancel patents issued to Minnesota for
certain tribal lands, 229 the Court concluded that "the United
States has a real and direct interest in the matter
presented .... [arising] out of its guardianship over the Indians,
and out of its right to invoke the aid of a court of equity in
removmg unlawful obstacles to the fulfillment of its
obligations"23 0-and held that this interest "is one which 1s
vested in [the United States] as a sovereign.''23l
Key among the United States' sovereign responsibilities to
Indian nations is its duty-and authority-"to do all that [is]
required ... to prepare the Indians to take their place as

227. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 556-57 (1832).
228. 270 U.S. 181 (1926).
229. See id. at 191-92.
230. Id. at 193-94; see FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 308
(2d ed. 1982) (hereinafter FEDERAL INDIAN LAW) (noting courts' view that when the
United States sues to enforce tribal rights it sues "on its own behalf, as well as on behalf
of the Indians, to protect its guardianship and to fulfill its trust obligations").
231. Minnesota, 270 U.S. at 194; cf Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S . 1, 34 (1911)
(allowing Virginia to assert a claim on behalf of bondholders among her citizenry,
because Virginia and West Virginia were both obligated on the debt in question and thus
West Virginia's agreement to bear an equitable share of the debt was "a contract in the
performance of which the honor and credit of Virginia is concerned").
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in dependent, qualified members of the modern body pohti-:::.":23 2
c;o:ncededly, the nation's early policies may not have
implemented this goal; but at least the structure of the ·e arly
relations among the feder al, state and tribal governments
tended to involve the tribes, to some degree, in determinations
that affected them. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries the
Constitution, and the Nonintercourse Act, provided that major
transactions between Indian tribes a n d non-native governments
should take place by federal treaty and thus, by definition,
should involve both the United States and the relevant Indian
tribe. 2 33 The Constitution gives t he fed eral government the
exclusive right to enter into treaties with In dian tribes, 234 and
the United States at first made extensive use of this right: by
1846, t he official compilation of federal treaties -with Indian
tribes filled an entire volume of the United States Statutes at
Large .235
Towards the end of the 19th century, however, treatymaking with Indian tribes fell victim to internecine
congressional politics. In 1871, Congress decided to end the
"practical exclusion" of the House of Representatives "from any
policy role in Indian affairs" by requiring that Indian policy be
set by bicameral legislation rather than by treaties entered into
by the Executive branch with the advice and consent of the
Senate.236 Accordingly, it passed a law providing that
hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an

232. Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715 (1943).
233. Cf James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction in
State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 583 (1994) (noting the view that obtained
"during and subsequent to the Revolutionary period" that "[d]isputes between sovereign
nations were to be resolved not through judicial process but through the negotiation of
treaties, the exchange of ambassadors, and, if necessary, through war"); id. n.105 ("It
was these methods of resolving disputes, of course, that the Constitution forbade to the
states.").
234. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832)
(In addition to the Indian Commerce Clause, federal authority over Indian affairs also
arises from "the powers of war and peace [and) of making treaties .").
235. See 7 Stat. 1-604 (1846); J. Res. 10 of Mar. 3, 1845, 5 Stat. 799 (1845)
(directing the compilation of "all Treaties with ... Indian tribes"). The editor's note to
the compilation observed that "[t)he constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as
well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned
the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and, consequently, admits their rank
among those powers who are capable of making treaties." Indian Treaties, 7 Stat. 9
(1846) (citing Worcester).
236. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 202 (1975).
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independent nation, tribe, or power ·with whom the Unit ed St ates
m ay contract by tr eaty: Provided, ji!rther, ri'hat nothing herein
contained sh all be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation
of any tr eaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such
Indian n ation or tribe.237

Given that throughout the 80 years prior to the passage of
this act the federal executive had concluded num erous treaties
·with Indian nations and the federal courts h ad u pheld a n d
en forced those treaties, the 1871 act's pronouncements on the
constitutional status of Indian n ations -vvere a striking
departure .238 But as one commentator has noted,239 if the act's
characterization of Indian nations r aised one issue of
dep a rtmental authority-by placing Congress in the role of
constitutional interpret er240-it was likely designed to sidestep
another-by masking the act's arrogation to Congress of a
portion of the treaty-making power.241
In a ny event, by the end of the 19th century the locus of
povv-er over Indian affairs moved from a t reaty setting-in which
the Indian nations had at least a nominal place 242-to a
legislative setting in which the Indian nations had no formal
role 243 and a judicial setting in which t he r ole of Indian tribal
237. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566, codified as amended at 25 U.S .C. § 71
(1994) .
238. See McSloy, supra note 30, at 243 (noting that "[f]or nearly a century of
American national experience, and several prior centuries of European experience,
treaties had been the formal mode of diplomatic relations with the Indians").
239. See id. at 243 n.196.
240. See id. (arguing that the Act's purported interpretation of the constitutional
term "foreign nation" raised a separation of powers issue, "particularly since the
Supreme Court had already addressed precisely that constitutional definition in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)").
241. See id. ("That the House of Representatives sought to redefine its jurisdiction,
not by explicitly seeking to include treaty ratification within its powers but instead by
declaring that Indian nations could no longer be recognized, shows that Congress
understood that it was changing the constitutional scheme and sought to handle the
politically sensitive issue through semantic subterfuge."),
242. On the other hand, it is well known that "[t]reaties [with Indian tribes] were
sometimes consummated by methods amounting to bribery, or signed by representatives
of only small parts of the signatory tribes. In accordance with the general rule
applicable to foreign treaties, however, the courts will not inquire into whether an
Indian tribe was properly represented during negotiation of a ratified treaty or whether
such treaty was procured by fraud or duress." FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 230, at
63 .
243. For a time after 1871, "the federal government continued to enter into
'agreements' with Native American tribes"-though such agreements now required the
approval of both houses of Congress-but "[t]he last such agreement was entered into in
1902." Siegfried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modem International Law, 7
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litigan t s -vvas unclear . Eventually, in the 20th century, Congress
v;ould make explicit its intent for Indian tribes t o be able t o sue
to enforce their r ights in feder al court; but in t h e meantime , the
Cour t h ad begun it s drastic expansion of state sover eign
immunit y.244
Th is h ist or y suggests why A rizona interven t ion is a
creature of t he 20th century: not because it is a departure from
the federal structure conceived by th e Framers, bu t because it is
a modern m anifestation of the very system they envisioned- a
system in wh ich the feder al government, j oint ly wit h the Indian
tribes, participates in the determination of In dian r igh t s .

3. T he practices of the Court
On a more pragmatic level, A rizona follows a long tradition
in which litigant s have been allowed t o inter vene or otherwise
participate in suits against states. Such par ticipation, a s t he
cases m ake clear, need not offend a st ate's immunity.
Maryland v. L ouisiana 24 5 provides a moder n illustration of
this principle. The dispute in Maryland concerned a Louisiana
tax (levied on pipeline companies) on the "first use" of any
n at ural gas imported into Louisiana which was not previously
taxed by another state or t he United States.246 Claiming that
this tax was unconstitutional, eight states filed an original
action in the Supreme Court against Louisiana, seeking
declar atory and injunctive relief and a r efund of taxes already
paid.247 In addition to the eight plaintiff states, the forces

ST. THOMAS L. REV. 567, 580 (1995). "With both houses of Congress involved, it did not
take long for Congress to move from approving executive actions (the Indian
'agreements' which now substituted for treaties) to initiating its own legislation ."
McSloy, supra note 30, at 244. Though in 1924 "all non-citizen Indians born within the
territorial limits of the United Sta tes" were "declared to be citizens of the United States,"
Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, Indian nations continue to lack the "procedural
protections" available to the states: "They do not enjoy senatorial representation nor do
they send delegations to the House of Representatives. They often do not even enjoy de
facto protections, as congressional districts often cut across tribal lines and reservation
boundaries, states resist Indian voting rights, and language barriers inhibit the
franchise." McSloy, supra note 30, at 260-61 (footnotes omitted).
244. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
245. 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
246. See id. at 731, 736.
24 7. S ee id. at 734. The Court held that the st a tes were entitled to sue beca use they
th emselves were substa ntial purch asers of gas, and because the challenged practice
affected their gener al populations "in a substantial way, " giving them an interest in
suing "as parens patriae." Id. a t 737.
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arrayed against Louisiana included 17 pipeline companies, 248
which the Court allowed to intervene because they had "a direct
sta ke in this controversy and in t he interest of a full exposition
of t he issues."24 9 Accordingly, Louisiana was forced to contend
with-at a minimum-three separate opposing counsel: one for
the United States, 250 at least one for the plaintiff states and at
least one for the pipeline companies.
In this respect, lv'Iaryland was hardly atypical, even among
cases involving state defendants .251 In particular, a number of
cases brought by the United States involving Indian tribes 252
illustrate that tribal litigants have taken the opportunity to
make distinct additional arguments not presented by the United
States ,253 without imposing undue burdens or creating problems
248. See id. at 734.
249. Jd. at 745 n. 21. The Court also noted "that it is not unusual to permit
intervention of private parties in original actions;" but lest this suggest that it was
drawing a distinction between such actions and those tha t originate in the district court,
one of the two cases it cited was Trbouitch u. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S . 528 (1972),
in which the Court held that intervention should have been permitted in the district
court.
250. The Court also permitted the United States and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission to intervene as plaintiffs, see Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S .
725, 745 n.21 (1981).
251. In Oklahoma u. Texas , 258 U .S. 574 (1922), for example, the Court held that
individuals could intervene in an original action between the named states concerning
state boundary lines and the title to a river bed, because the Court had appointed a
receiver to take possession of the disputed territory , see id. at 578, 580-81. As the Court
explained, the individuals' claims "for particular tracts and funds in the receiver's
possession and exclusively under our control" could not be brought before any other
authority, and such claims "may be dealt with as ancillary to the suit wherein the
possession is taken and the control exercised-and this although independent suits to
enforce the claims could not be entertained in the court," id. at 581. Regardless of
whether this holding is affected by the Court's statements in Pennhurst concerning
pendent jurisdiction, see supra notes [17 4-81) and accompanying text, Oklahoma still
stands as another illustration that the participation of individuals in suits against states
is perfectly workable.
Similarly, in Virginia u. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1 (1911), the Court allowed
counsel for individual bondholders to participate as amicus curiae in Virginia's suit to
force West Virginia to bear an equitable share of the bond debt, see id. at 10. And in
North Carolina u. Tennessee, 235 U.S. 1 (1914), a boundary suit between the two states,
the reporter noted that an individual had filed a brief "[b)y leave of court," id. at 2.
252. See, e.g., United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1979)
(adjudicating appeal by United States and plaintiff-intervenor tribe), reu'd on other
grounds, 450 U.S. 544, 546, 568 (1981) (United States and Crow Tribe were also
represented by separate counsel before the Supreme Court); United States v. Michigan,
623 F.2d 448, 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (two Indian tribes intervened in United
States' suit to enforce treaty fishing rights and were separately represented as
intervenors), order modified on other grounds, 653 F .2d 277 (6th Cir.).
253 . For example, in United States ex rel. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe u. South
Dakota, 105 F.3d 1552 (8th Cir. 1997), the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe intervened in an

R.AISING ARIZONA

2000

155

of judicial administration.

B. Arizona and the Co urt's Functional Concerns
That the formal ass essments outlined above lead back to
functional questions should not be surprising, for as the Alden
Court emphasized, its views of form r est on substantive
foundations. 254 In the present context, the results of the
:functional analysis corroborate those of the formal inquiry, for
both the United States' r ole in Arizona suits and the unique
relationship between federal and tribal governments justify the
use of Arizona intervention.

1. The role of the federal plaintiff
With respect to the A lden Court's functional analysis,
Arizona suits start out with an obvious advantage over the qui
tam suits discussed above: in an Arizona suit, by definition, the
United States is an actual party plaintiff. The United States'
presence in the suit, as will be seen below, addresses each of the
Alden Court's substantive concerns about suits against states.

a. Control
In the crudest terms, to the extent that the Arizona theory
is the sole basis for piercing a state defendant's sovereign
immunity to a tribe's damages claims, the United States
appears to have veto power over those claims. By dismissing its
own claim, the federal plaintiff could give the state the
opportunity to assert sovereign immunity to the claims of the
tribe. 255 Of course, such power might seem to result in a blunt,
action in which the United States sought declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief
against South Dakota with respect to that State's imposition of an excise tax and
registration fee on Indians living within reservation boundaries. See id. at 1554, 1555 &
n.5. The Court of Appeals held that the district court should not have rejected the claim
for damages pressed by the United States and the Tribe, since "[t]he Eleventh
Amendment does not apply . .. because the United States brought the action." Id. at
1560. Significantly, on appeal the Tribe, but not the United States, pressed the claim
that South Dakota's excise tax should not apply to nonmember Indians residing on the
Tribe's reservation; and though the Court ultimately rejected the Tribe's contention, it
did so after a consideration of the merits. See id. at 1559-60.
254. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2264 (1999) ("Underlying constitutional
form are considerations of great substance."); id. at 2268 ("[I]n a Constitution as resilient
as ours form mirrors substance.").
255. If the United States were able to dismiss its claim with prejudice, the state
defendant might also contend that the judgment dismissing the United States' claim
bars the tribal plaintiffs claim on principles of res judicata. See Nevada v. United
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a ll-or-nothing kind of control; but in practice the tribal plaintiffs
are likely to work cooperatively with the federal plaintiff, n ot
just because of common interests but also out of awareness that
to assert the Arizona doctrine they need t h e United States in the
case. Also, to the extent that the federal trust responsibility t o
t he tribal plaintiff would constrain the U nited States' ability t o
dismiss its claims against the state, 256 that trust obligation
Sta tes, 463 U .S. 110, 135 (1983) (Indian tribe "whose interests were r epresented .. . by
the United States, can be bound by the . .. decree") . But such a rule is a ppropriate, if a t
all, only wher e th e United States has asserted the tribe's claim, not tried to expunge it .
S ee, e.g., Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dep't of Interior , 798 F.2d 389, 390, 392 (lOth
Cir. 1986) (noting that "intervention was proper beca use the government not only
ina dequately represented the Indian lessors whose interests were entrusted to it but a lso
'in effect conceded the case a t the outset,"' and holding th at "[s]ince the intervenors wer e
not adequately r epresented in the first instance, the prin ciple of res judicata does not
apply to them"). A contrmy outcome would r aise-among ot her concerns-separation of
powers issues , for if a dismissal of the federal government's suit ba rred the tribal
plaintiffs suit, the Executive branch would h ave the ability to extinguish whole causes of
action created by Congress for Indian tribes.
A more difficult question-in light of N evada- ru:ises if the United States does
not simply seek dismissal of its claim, but rather seeks dismissal as part of a settlement
in which value flows to the tribe. Nevada , for instance, concerned the preclusive effect of
a decree entered pursuant to a settlement agreement to which the United States-but
not the relevant Indian r eserva tion-was a party. Significa ntly, the settlement decree
awarded the reservation considerable water rights , see N evada , 463 U .S. at 117. Thus,
the Court's holding in Nevada-that the reservation was bound by the settlement
decree-should at least be limited to instances where the judgment arises from a
settlement that provides significant value to the tribal plaintiff.
Moreover, the Nevada Court's refusal to examine the adequacy of the United
States' representation of the reservation's interests is in tension with the Arizona
Court's determination that an Indian tribe should be allowed to participate in the
determination of its rights. In the non-Indian context, the Court has made clear that
considerable care is necessary to safegumd the interests of class members purportedly
represented in the negotiation of a settlement agreement. See Ortiz v. Fibrebomd Corp.,
119 S. Ct. 2295 , 2315 (1999); Amchem Prods. , Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S . Ct. 2231, 2252
(1997). It would be worse than ironic if a different result were to obtain in the Indian
law context on the basis of the federal government's trust obligation to Indian tribes.
In any event, in practice this question can, and should, be avoided. Once the
defendant has answered, under Rule 41 a voluntary dismissal requires either a
stipulation signed by all parties, or an order of the court. See FED. R. Crv. P. 41(a). The
tribal plaintiff can obviously block the former, and when the latter is requested, the
court can simply provide in its order that the dismissal is without prejudice. This should
not offend separation of powers principles, because the only discretion the court would be
removing from the executive branch is the discretion to compromise a tribal claim
against the wishes of the tribe ; and such discretion itself, as discussed above, raises
separation of powers concerns.
256. Compare Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Wilson, 987 F. Supp. 804, 809 (N.D. Cal.
1997) (holding that the United States had a fiduciary duty to sue California on behalf of
the tribes to enforce the provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act because "absent
representation, the Tribes will have no lega l remedy with which to bring the State to the
bargaining table and obtain the benefits of IGRA"), with Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v .
Reno, 56 F .3d 1476, 14 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the Attorney General h a d
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would obtain whether or not t he tribal plaintiff was in the suit.
Accordingly, in an A rizo na case the U nited States has as much
ultimate control over the conduct of the suit as it would if it
were the only plaintiff.

b. Accountability
In an Arizona suit, the United States, as an actual plaintiff,
cannot avoid political accountability for the claims against the
state. This fact helps explain why, as discussed in Part V.B.
below, state sovereign immunity should not bar a tribal plaintiff
from seeking more extensive relief than the United States
requests. Of course, the Court has stated that "the impetus for
the Eleventh Arnendment" was t h e "prevention of federal-court
judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury."2 5 7 But in
practical terms, the United States-which clearly has the right
to seek relief from the state to the fullest extent allowed by
law-is politically accountable, not only for the relief it seeks
from the state, but also for the relief that its presence enables
the tribe to seek from the state. Those affected by the claims for
relief are unlikely to absolve the United States of responsibility
for the demands of the tribal co-plaintiff, especially in cases
where it is only the presence of the United States that enables
the tribe's damages claims to proceed against the state.
c. InfLuence

The Court has, on occasion, expressed concern that if
individuals were permitted to sue states, "the course of [the
states'] public policy and the administration of their public
affairs should be subject to and controlled by the mandates of
judicial tribunals, without their consent, and in favor of
discretion to refuse to assert water rights claims on behalf of the Shoshone-Bannock
Tribes); id. at 1484 (Rogers, J ., and Wald, J., concurring) (noting that "as the federal
government's trust responsibility toward a particular tribal resource increases in scope,
the Attorney General's prosecutorial discretion contracts").
257. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994). The Court has
further held that "it is the [state] entity's potential legal liability, rather than its ability
or inability to require a third party to reimburse it, or to discharge the liability in the
first instance, that is relevant." Regents of the Univ. of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425,
431 (1997 ). To the extent that the Court's reasoning rests on the thought that liability
visited on an insurer or the like would eventually raise the state's costs of insuring, this
holding still implicates the immunity-from-liability theory; but to the extent that it r ests
on the view that the state should be immune from purely symbolic legal liability
regardless of any effect on state coffers, it appears to circle back to the dignity interests
discussed in Part IV.A.l. above.
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individual interests." 258 In this view, the "constitutional system
of cooperative federalism" disfavors suits t hat "inter fere with [a
state's] capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities ."259
Here, again, Arizona raises no concerns. If the federal system
affor ds states latitude to operate freely within their spheres of
sovereignty, it does not grant them licen se to violate federal
law; 260 and ·while individuals may not be able to sue s tates t o
enforce this demarcation, it is well established that the United
States can. 261 In sum, state sovereignty does not prevent the
United States from disr upting a state's conduct of its own affairs
by suing to enforce federal rights.
In fact, Arizona suits serve the principles of "cooperative
federalism" by ensuring that the Executive branch will be in a
position to exert influence and-potentially-mediate disputes
between the tribal plaintiff and the state defend ant. As a
plaintiff, the United States will likely be a party to any
settlement negotiations and will be intimately knowledgeable
about the status of the suit. This involvement will often give it
the opportunity to use its influence with the various participants
to try to reach a n egotiated resolution.

d. Judgment
In an Arizona case, the claims against the state defendant
will be screened by the federal government. While the tribal
plaintiff may, as discussed in Part V.D. below, press alternative
theories and seek additional relief, the tribal claims against the
state defendant must arise from the same transaction as the
claims by the United States. As a practical matter, this r ule
satisfies the Alden concern with federal discretion, by ensuring

258. Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887); see also Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct.
2240, 2265 (1999) ("If the principle of representative government is to be preserved to
the States, the balance between competing interests must be reached after deliberation
by the political process established by the citizens of the State, not by judicial decree
mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the private citizen."); but see id. at
2289 n.36 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court's position "comes perilously close to legitimizing political defiance of valid
federal law").
259. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 n.24 (1979) (holding that a suit arising from
a Nevada employee's traffic accident occurring outside Nevada would not interfere with
Nevada's fulfillment of those responsibilities and thus this concern did not bar such a
suit against Nevada in California state court).
260. See, e.g. , Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266 (state sovereign immunity "does not confer
upon the State a concomitant right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law").
261. See supra notes [199-201) and accompanying text.
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that the federal plaintiff will be able to sift through the facts an d
decide which t r ansactions to sue upon.

e. Burdens
In an A rizona suit, the United States must com mit its own
resources and shoulder all the obligations of a litigant. It m u st
allocate t he funds necessary to pay the costs of litigation. It
must abide by the same discovery r ules as any other litigant . It
is su bject to the disciplinary au thority of the court. In short; t he
fe deral plaintiff in an Arizona suit m ust "put its mon ey wh ere
its m outh is ."

2. Fulfilling the trust relationship
Arizona suits, t hen, fit t he paradigm for federal suit s
against states, and as such they avoid the bar of state sovereig-n
immunity. To end the analysis there, however, w ould be to
ignore additional reasons why Arizona intervention is uniquely
a ppropriate to suits involving claims on behalf of Indian tribes.
Specifically, one of the most important aspects of Arizona
in t ervention is its potential to aid the United States in fulfilli n g
its sovereign commitment to the Indian tribes by empowering
the tribes to participate in the assertion of their rights. The
"proper fulfillment of [the United States'] trust require[s]
turning over to the Indians a greater control of their own
destinies." 262 Thus, in Arizona, the Court justified the tribes'
in tervention by noting that "the Indians ar e entitled 'to take
their place as independent qualified members of the modern
body politic'," and that "[a]ccordingly, the Indians' participation
in litigation critical to their welfare should not be
discouraged." 263 In this respect, Arizona intervention directly
promotes the United States' assertion of its sovereign interest in
the fulfillment of its trust obligation. 264
Arizona intervention furthers the United States' fulfillment
of its trust obligations by allowing the tribes to monitor and
supplement the government lawyers' advocacy. Though the

262. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,553 (1974).
263. Arizona, 460 U.S. at 615 (quoting Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365,
369 (1968)).
264. Cf United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 870,
882-83 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that "the United States' very ability to sue as the tribes'
trustee, which was unquestioned in Blatchford, depended on an injury to the United
States as sovereign when injury was inflicted on the tribes").
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United States has the potential to be a powerful guardian, it is
also often a conflicted one, for it represents many interests in
a ddition to, and sometimes in opposition to, those of Indian
tribes.2 65 And t hough the Court is willing, of necessity, to
tolerate the United States' concurrent representation of diverse
interests, 266 it has noted Congress's concer n with "situations in
which the United States suffered from a conflict of interests or
was otherwise unable or unwilling to bring suit as trustee for
the Indians." 267 Thus, the Court has emphasized that the
assertion of Indian rights "should not depend on the good
judgment or zeal of a government attorney."268
Arizona itself is a case in point. In that case, the Tribes
sought leave to intervene t o assert rights that the U nited States
had failed to press on t heir beha lf. 269 Not only had the United
States omitted to present these claims, but initially it even
opposed the Tribes' intervention. 270 And when, later , the federal
government dropped its resistance to the Tribes' intervention
and joined forces with them in pressing their claims, its claims
on behalf of each Tribe were, in almost every instance,
significantly smaller in scope than those asserted by the Tribes'
attorneys. 271 These differences, far from raising an immunity
issue, were rightly seen by the Special Master to weigh in favor
of tribal intervention. 272
It is of course true that the "conflicts" rationale for tribal

265. See, e.g., Department of Justice Policy on Indian Sovereignty and Governmentto-Government Relations with Indian Tribes (unsigned, undated version found July 10,
1999 at <http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/sovtrb.htm>) ("The Department represents the United
States, in coordination with other federal agencies, in litigation brought for the benefit of
Indian tribes and individuals, as well as in litigation by Indian tribes or individuals
against the United States or its agencies. In litigation as in other matters, the
Department may take actions and positions affecting Indian tribes with which one or
more tribes may disagree.").
266. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983) ("[I]t is simply
unrealistic to suggest that the Government may not perform its obligation to represent
Indian tribes in litigation when Congress has obliged it to represent other interests as
well.").
267. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 559 n.10 (1983) (discussing
Congress's reasons for passing 28 U.S.C . § 1362); see id. at 557 (noting "the fact that the
Indians ... might not be adequately represented by the United States in state court in
light of conflicts of interest between the Federal Government's responsibilities as trustee
and its own claims to water").
268. Poafpybitty, 390 U.S. at 374.
269. See Arizona, 460 U.S. at 612.
270. See id.
271. See Special Master Report, supra note 150, at 3 & n.6.
272. See id. at 11.
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intervention may some times be in tension with the Court's view
tha t suits by the United St a tes against a state are permissible
in part because the federal plaintiff is politically accountable for
its actions.
In certain situations, this very political
accountability might r esult in pressure on the federal plaintiff to
a bandon an u npopular position which it is asserting on behalf of
t he tribe, and the tribe's ability to assert the position for itself
might t hen be seen as neutralizing the effects of t h e
governmen t's political accountability. However, this concern is
counter balanced by two important considerations. First, the
tribes' ability to assert positions that others press the United
Sta tes t o a bandon may provide the tribes wit h an oppor tunity to
demonstrate the merit of t hose positions and thus to inform the
decision ultimately reach ed by the federal plaintiff.273 Though
the Court may value the fact that the federal plaintiff is
politically accountable, such accountability is not diminished by
an opportunity for full consideration of the tribe's position.
Second , in cases where there is no other basis on which the
tribal plaintiff can seek damages against the state, the federal
plaintiff retains ultimate control over the claim against the
state. 274
In addition, the "accountability" argument should be
considered in context. The Court's concern in Alden that a
"politically responsib[le]" federal plaintiff exercise "control" over
the litigation notwit hstanding, 275 there is little apparent value
in precluding a court from hearing the full range of valid
arguments in support of the asserted claims. If a federal
plaintiff fails to make an important argument-either because of
a conflict of interest or because of a lack of resources or intimate
knowledge of the tribe's interests-the tribal plaintiffs presence
in the suit ensures that the tribe has the opportunity to inform
the court of its view. To be sure, the state defendant benefits if
the plaintiffs, collectively, omit a potentially winning argument;
but surely sovereign prerogatives do not include the right to
hoodwink a court.
Similarly, a state's wish to avoid the burdens of litigation276

273. Cf Resnik, supra note 21, at 757 (suggesting that one who values the dialogue
between federal and tribal governments "would be supportive of enabling two voices , of
cohabitation rather than domination, of having governments with different 'interests'
and 'ideology' thus enabling 'innovation"').
274. See Part IV.B.1.a. above.
275.
Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999).
276. Qualified immunity has been justified on the grounds that the specter of
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should not enable it to muzzle those who can provide useful
information to the court. Although the Court has intimated that
sovereign immunity may serve to protect stat es from litigation
burdens, 277 the weight of this rationale is unclear because the
Court customarily adverts to more amorphous dignity concerns
as well.
As the Court :cecently stated, while Eleventh
Amendment immunity "is justified in part by a concern that
States not be unduly burdened by litigation, its u ltimate
justification is t he impmtance of ensuring t hat the States>
dignitary interests can be fully vindicated." 278 The Court's
habitual resort t o t h e dignity rationale may have a llmved it to
avoid considering fully whether the "burden" concern is apposite
in questions of state-as opposed to individual-immunity.
In any event, the state can have no legitimate complaint
abou t the bur dens imposed by a suit by the United States; 279 and
t he Arizona case demonstrates that no undue additional burden
is posed by tribal intervention. In Arizona , t he Court permitted
the assertion of claims by five separate tribes-apparently
represented by at least three different counsel2 80-in addition to
the United States. The Special l\1aster rejected the states'
argument "that representation of the Tribes' interests by both
litigation could chill government employees in the exercise of their duties and deter
others from seeking government employment. Individual defendants may well face
personal stigma and familial stress from being sued; their limited personal resources will
likely render them risk-averse with r espect to the outcome of the suit; and these and
other effects of the suit will likely distract them from their work. See Green v. Brantley,
941 F.2d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir. 1991) (en bane) (holding that refusal to grant a defendant
summary judgment based on qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the
collateral order doctrine, even if an additional damages claim will proceed to trial
anyway).
But whatever the merits of this concern as applied to individuals, its
persuasiveness diminishes markedly when invoked as a justification for state sovereign
immunity, for a state is better able to defend suits, and less likely to be affected by their
pendency, than is an individual official. Cf Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 150 (1993) (Stevens, J ., dissenting) (distinguishing
the right of immediate appeal of denials of qualified immunity as based on the concern
that "the specter of a long and contentious legal proceeding in and of itself would inhibit
government officials from exercising their authority with the freedom and independence
necessary to serve the public interest").
277. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 147.
278. Id. (holding that a denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity is immediately
appealable under the collateral order doctrine).
279. The general proposition stated in Puerto Rico Aqueduct that the Eleventh
Amendment prevents the states from being subjected "to the coercive process of judicial
tribunals at the instance of private parties," 506 U.S. at 146 (internal quotation marks
omitted), applies by its own terms to "private" suits and not to claims asserted by the
United States.
280. See Special Master Report, supra note 150, at 9 n.l6_
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t
, and.- C0 n lholon,-reasoning t hat the states' concerns could be addressed by
ensuring that the "or der of proof and examination" were
"structured in a logical sequ ence which avoids duplication or
accumul ation ."282
In fact, Arizona's view accords with the long practice in the
federal courts of allovving parties to intervene or othe:rwise
participate in suits against states .283 Likewise, since the claims
of A rizona intervenors will concern the same transactions put at
issue by the United States' claims 284 and since district judges
h ave ample ability to shape the presentation of the issues and
avoid cumulative arguments and evidence, 285 t he tribal
interven01·'s presentation will increase the state's litigation
burdens only to the extent that it bears u pon the matters
already before the court. Any right a state may have to be free
of litigation burdens does not, surely, include a right to
circumscribe the facts and law presented in support of the
government's claims.2S6
Finally, tribal participation in federal suits against states,
to the extent it aids the presentation of the issues, can be seen
as one way to strengthen federal protections in an area that
suffers from chronic underenforcement of federal rights. As a
general matter, the Court's view of state sovereign immunity is
colored by its "unwilling[ness] to assume the States will refuse
to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United
States."287 Since "[t]he States and their officers are bound by
obligations imposed by the Constitution and by federal
statutes," any shortfall in federal enforcement capabilities is
,--.., _L
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281. Id. at 14.
282. Id. at 16.
283. See Part IV.A.3. above .
284. See Part V.B. below.
285. See Part V.D. below.
286. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts,
Agencies and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 746 (1968) (noting with respect to
agency proceedings that "th e very fact that the intervener-from the vantage point of his
own interest-sees the case with a perspective and perhaps an intensity different from
that of the agency charged with the protection of the public as a whole may indicate that
h e can in fact contribute to the court's total understanding"); THE LAWYER'S CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 7-23 (noting that "[t]he
complexity of law often makes it difficult for a tribunal to be fully informed unless the
pertinent law is presented by the lawyers in the cause," and noting that this
presentation is a requisite of the adversary system).
287.
Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999).
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counterbalanced by "[t]he good faith of the States ."288 In the
context of Indian law, however, the states' good faith has all too
often been remarkable for its absence.
Indeed, the fi r st
Congress passed the Nonintercourse Act specifically t o protect
Indian tribes from fraudulent land tran sactions, many of which
were perpetrated by the states themselves . Nearly a century
afterward, th e Court would note that "[b] ecause of the local ill
feeling, the people of the states where [Indian tribes] are found
are often their deadliest enemies." 289 Even today, federal courts
grapple with the continuing effects of the states' :'highhanded
attitude" in dealing with Indian tribes "throughout history."290
Accordingly, in the unique context of Indian law, Arizona
intervention is more than permissible: it is n ecessary.
V. ARIZONA IN PRACTICE

Arizona intervention, thus, is doctrinally justified even
under the current Court's expansive views of state sovereign
immunity. This section examines several of the procedural
questions that may anse 1n connection with Arizona
intervention.
A. Does it Matter Who First Brings the Claim?
Although this Article refers to Arizona intervention as
shorthand for the tribal participation approved in Arizona, the
Arizona question may arise in a number of procedural contexts.
Whether those permutations give rise to the same result should
depend on their functional similarity to Arizona, rather than on
mere formal distinctions.
Litigation commenced by the United States is perhaps the
simplest case, for the intervention of a tribal plaintiff in an
existing suit by the United States, pursuant to Arizona,
obviously does not enlarge the court's jurisdiction. Likewise,
litigation commenced jointly by the United States and a tribe
raises no special issues under Arizona. And where the United
States has intervened in an existing tribal suit against private
entities, and the federal and tribal plaintiffs move concurrently
to amend their respective complaints to add state defendants,
288. Id.
289. United States v. Kagama, 118 U .S. 375, 384 (1886).
290. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, No. 80-CV-930 & 80-CV-960, 1999 WL
224615, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. April 15, 1999) (discussing New York State's treatment of
Cayuga India ns).
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the procedural stance is functionally the same as m a suit
brought simultaneously by the United States and the tribe.
A more interesting question arises where a t:ribe h as sued a
state and the United States later intervenes and also asserts
claims against the state. In this situation, the state might seek
dismissal of the tribe's claim on the ground that the court never
originally had jurisdiction over that claim. If the state has
omitted to raise a sovereign immunity challenge prior to the
United States' assertion of its own claim against the state, the
state's contention should fail since the question of sovereign
immunity need not be considered until it is pressed by the
state 291 -at which point the proceeding is functionally similar to
one brought simultaneously by the federal and tribal
plaintiffs. 292
Even if the state raised its immunity claim prior to the
United States' intervention, however, it should prove no more
successful. 'Nhen an original plaintiffs suit is dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction, the court has discretion to retain an intervenor's
pleading and treat it as a separate action. 29 3 Thus, the United
States' complaint could still proceed-and the tribal plaintiff
could then seek intervention in the United States' action to
assert its claims 294 against the state. 295 Given that the tribal
291. See Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S . Ct. 2047, 2052 (1998) .
292. To the extent that a court might reason that dismissal would be warranted due
to the initial lack of jurisdiction, under the analysis explained below the court should
nonetheless not dismiss the tribe's complaint.
293. S ee Mille Lacs Band v. Minnesota, 124 F .3d 904, 913 (8th Cir. 1997); Town of
West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted)
(quoting 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 1917, at 458-59 (2d. ed. 1983)).
294. A dismissal on jurisdictional grounds is not on the merits, see FED. R. CIV. P.
41(b), and accordingly, dismissal on the basis of state sovereign immunity has no res
judicata effect. See, e.g., Voisin's Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F .2d 183, 188 (5th
Cir. 1986). Although the Court has not yet decided whether state sovereign immunity is
a matter of subject matter jurisdiction or of personal jurisdiction, see Schacht, 118 S. Ct.
at 2054 (observing that the question is undecided with respect to Eleventh Amendment
immunity); id. at 2055 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting similarities to both subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction), both sorts of jurisdictional dismissals are
without prejudice under Rule 41(b). See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER
& EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 4436, at 344 (1981). And
while a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds will bar relitigation of the particular
jurisdictional issue decided, see id. at 340, this rule is inapplicable here because a suit by
the federal government, in which a tribal plaintiff intervenes, presents a different state
sovereign immunity question than a suit by the tribal plaintiff alone.
295. Thus, in one of the S eneca cases the court held that a tribe's claims against a
state could proceed even though the United States did not seek to intervene in the action
until after the state had raised its Eleventh Amendment defense against the tribe's
claims. S ee Seneca Nation v. New York, 26 F . Supp.2d 555, 564-65 (W.D.N .Y. 1998)
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plaintiffs claims could thus be h eard nonetheless, efficiency
counsels that the court refuse to dismiss those claims once t'ne
U nited States has sought t o intervene.296

B. Can a Tribe Bring Additional Claims and Seeh More
Extensive R elief?
A rizona suggests that a tribal plaintiff may assert ctmms
that differ from those of the United States, so long as the tribal
claims arise from the same transaction as the United States'
claims. Likewise , although it is n ot clear to what extent a tribal
plaintiff can ultimately recover damages in an amount greater
than is sought by the United States, it is well established that
t ribal plaintiffs can seek such relief as an initial matter.
One of the reasons that the Court granted the Tribes'
request to intervene in Arizona was that "the United States'
action as their representative will bind the Tribes to any
judgment. "297
A state that defends against tribal claims
asserted by the federa l government will likely claim in any later
litigation that claims by the tribe that arise out of the same
transaction or series of related transactions are barred by th e
doctrine of claim preclusion. 298 There is consequently a certain
symmetry to the Court's reasoning that the states involved in
the Arizona case "no longer may assert [sovereign] immunity
with respect to the subject matter of this action." 299 Thus, at
least one court has read Arizona to establish that '"new claims
or issues' may be raised [by the tribal plaintiff] so long as those
issues or claims encompass the same subject matter as the
original claims or issues [asserted by the United States] ."300
(holding that since the tribal plaintiff "would still be entitled to intervene in the United
States' case" if its own case were dismissed, "[t)he interest of judicial economy is best
served by allowing the Senecas' claims to continue"); see also Mille Lacs Band, 124 F.3d
at 913 (fact that the United States was merely a plaintiff-intervenor was "not
controlling" for Eleventh Amendment purposes).
296. Arizona itself demonstrates the propriety of this outcome. The claims that the
Tribes were permitted to assert in Arizona were initially raised by the Tribes and only
belatedly asserted by the United States, and by the time intervention was granted no
other issues remained to be determined.
297. Arizona v. Califomia, 460 U.S. 605, 615 (1983).
298. See supra note 255.
299. Arizona, 460 U.S. at 614.
300. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, Nos. 80 CV-930 & 80-CV-960, 1999 WL
509442, at *13. The court in Cayuga noted that "at the same time the Arizona Court
stated that '[t]he Tribes [were) not seek[ing) to bring new claims or issues against the
state,' it recognized that in the Tribes' motion to intervene they made 'claims for
additional water rights to reservation lands."' Id. (quoting Arizona, 460 U.S. at 612)
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does not require that t he pleadings of the federal and trib al
plaintiffs be identical. But even apar t from t he tribe's ability to
seek greater relief, t h e principles of notice pleading make clear
that t he tribe's compla int n eed not be confined to the relief
demanded in t he United St ates' complaint .
'While t he Federal Rules require that a party's pleading
include "a deman d for judgment for the relief the pleader
seeks ,"30 2 t hey also provide that "[e]xcept as t o a party against
whom a judgment is entered by default, ever y final judgment
shall grant t h e r elief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not dem anded su ch
r elief in t he party's pleadings."303 Thus , "[a] part y's r ecovery is
limited to the amount prayed for in its demand for judgment
only in cases where judgment is entered by default,"30 4 and a
plaintiff "need not set forth any theory or demand any par ticular
relief for the court will award appropriate relief if the plaintiff is
entitled to it on any theory."305 "If a pleading pr ovides a
defendant notice of the plaintiffs claims and the grounds for the
claims, omissions in a prayer for relief do not bar redress of
n-

A

L
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(alterations in original); but see Seneca Nation v. New York, 178 F .3d 95, 97 (2d Cir.
1999) (per curiam) (stating in dictum that "the State of New York r etains its Eleventh
Amendment immunity to the extent that the Seneca Nation of India ns or the
Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians raise claims or issues that are not identical to those
made by the United States"), cert. den ied, 2000 WL 11856 (Jan. 10, 2000).
301. S ee supra notes [166-67) and accompanying text.
302. FED. R. CN. P. 8(a)(3).
303 . FED. R. CN. P . 54(c).
304. Scala v. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc., 985 F .2d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1993 )
(rejecting contention that jury award should be reduced because it exceeded amount
demanded in original complaint).
305. Gilba ne Bldg. Co. v. Feder al Reserve Bank, 80 F .3d 895, 900 (4th Cir . 1996 )
(quoting New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323 F .2d 20, 24-25 (4th Cir . 1963)).
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th at a party will not necessarily know, when initiating a claim,
precisely what the evidence will show or what will he the most
appropriate relief.
In joint federal-tribal litigation, this
uncertainty would raise problems if sovereign immunity issues
turned on the relief sought by each plaintiff at the outset.
Private litigants may quite properly resolve uncertainty by
claiming all relief to which they anticipate they could
conceivably demonstrate a viable claim. 3° 7 By contrast, the
fe deral government-out of concerns over scarce lit igation
resources 308 or the like-may omit from its prayer for relief
components that, as the litigation progresses and the evidence
unfolds, it may later wish to claim on the tribe's behalf. 309
Thus, the fact that a tribe's pleading requests more or
different relief than the pleading filed by the United States
should be irrelevant.

D. Who Can Make What Arguments?
One of the key principles underlying Arizona is that Indian
tribes must be allowed to "participat[e] in litigation critical to
their welfare." 310 Inherent in meaningful participation is the
ability to make arguments and present evidence not put forward
by the federal trustee. 3 ll Thus, courts should place no abnormal
306. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. East Dayton Tool & Die Co., 14 F .3d 1122, 1127
(6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
307. For instance, under the Federal Rules it is permissible to include in a
complaint allegations that presently lack evidentiary support, so long as the attorney
filing the complaint can certifY that such allegations "are likely to have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery." FED. R.
Crv. P. 11(b)(3).
308. Once the federal government sues a state on a tribe's behalf, it has met the
Alden Court's requirement that the United States place its resources behind the claim
against the state. To require in addition that the United States seek, from the outset,
each specific aspect of relief that a tribe requests would be to strain the Court's
reasoning beyond any practical purpose. If a claim is important enough to prompt the
United States to sue a state, it is important enough to warrant a court's consideration of
all valid forms of relief, including those pressed initially by the tribe alone.
309. Although courts will refuse to grant belatedly requested relief where its award
would be unfairly prejudicial, see, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424
(1975), it is hard to imagine prejudice arising in the context addressed here, where the
very basis for the state's challenge would be that the tribe has given notice, in its own
pleading, that it seeks different or more extensive relief than that sought by the federal
government.
310. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S . 605, 615 (1983).
311. As discussed in Part IV.B.2. above, the tribe's ability to supplement the United
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lim.itations on a tribe's advocacy of claims it presses n1 common
vvith the United States .
Obviously, this is not to say that Arizona intervention will
lead to a litigation free-for-all. Just as in any other case, the
district judge has the ability to oversee the course of
discovery, 312 protect the parties from unreasonable demands,313
maintain control of pretrial proceedings 314 and guide the conduct
of the trial.3 15 The trial judge's authority to structure the
proceeding, coupled with the fact that an Arizona intervenor's
claims against a state will arise from the same transaction(s) as
the claims brought by the United States, 316 will ensure that the
presen ce of the Arizona intervenor creates no undue litigation
burdens .
E'. Does it lVIatter That a Tribe Might Appeal Even If the United
States Does Not?

A state defendant might contend that, if the federal
government does not appeal from a judgment, an appeal by a
tribe 317 will offend state sovereign immunity. Arguably, neither

States' presentation not only benefits the tribe, and the accurate presentation of the
issues, but also aids the United States in fulfilling its trust responsibility to the tribe.
312. S ee, e.g., FED. R Crv. P . 26(b)(2) (court may limit unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative discovery); FED. R Crv. P. 26(d) (upon motion, and for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice , the court may set parameters fo r
the timing and sequence of discovery).
313. See, e.g., FED. R Crv. P. 26(c) (where movant shows good cause, court may
issue orders to protect a party from, inter alia, undue burden and expense arising from
discovery requests).
314. See, e.g., FED. R Crv. P. 16 (court may hold pretrial conferences to establish
and maintain control of pretrial proceedings).
315. See, e.g., FED. R Evm. 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by, inter alia, "considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence"); 2 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 403.06[1] at 403-60 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, gen. ed., 2d ed. 1999) ("[T]rial
judges have wide discretion to exclude [cumulative evidence] so they may conduct trials
efficiently.").
316. Thus, the relevant evidence will be overlapping if not identical, and its
presentation can be structured, with the guidance of the court, so as not to prolong
unduly the proceedings. By contrast, presentation of a claim that is entirely factually
unrelated to the United States' claims would be more likely to expand the scope and
length of the proceedings to an extent that could raise legitimate concerns.
317. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 375-76 (1987)
("An intervenor, whether by right or by permission, normally h as the right to appeal an
adverse final judgment by a trial court."); see also 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR
R MILLER & EDWARD H . COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 3902.1, at 109
& n.13 (2d ed. 1991) (citing Stringfellow).
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functional concerns·318 nor r elevant doctrines 319 support such a
318. If a case is important enough for the United States to litigate it to conclusion at
the level of the district court, the United States' decision not to commit reso urces to an
a ppeal should not be taken as a sign that the case is low priority. At the district court
level , t h e question of resources is essentially a finan cial one, and a pla usible argument
can be made that the Fra mers were cognizant of this limitation when they crafted the
Constitution. After all , it was readily apparent during the early days of t h e Union that
the United States' powers of enforcement through litigation would be limited by the
scarcity of its funds. On a ppeal, however, the impact on the United States' litigation
budget is likely to be less, and the more pressing question will be whether the United
States is willing to seek a ppella te attention on the matter a t hand, possibly a t the
expense of securing appell ate scrutiny of other matter s. This consideration, unlike the
financi al concern, is unlikely to have been part of the Framers' calculus, since the
F r amers presum a bly did not anticipate the present scope of substantive fede ral law, the
concom itant profusion of federal statutes a nd enforcement agencies, or t h e resulting
n umber of cases in which the fed er a l government would wish to seek appellate review .
Accordingly, it is unlikely that the states, in consenting to suit by the United States,
would h ave relied on the concept that the federal government would be self-limiting in
the number of matters which it chose to appeal.
Moreover , even if the United States' failure to appeal is instead a response to
political concerns, this sh ould not mean that the appellate courts should be divested of
their a bility to h ear the a ppeal. A st ate's interest in retaining the benefit of an incorrect
district court decision is flimsy compared with the interest of the federal system in the
uniformity and correctness of feder al law.
319. For instance, there is some doctrinal support for the view tha t the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply to appellate proceedings . "(A] State does not consent to suit
in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation." College
Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S . Ct. 2219, 2226
(1999) (citing Smith v. Reeves, 178 U .S . 436 , 441-45 (1900)) . But it is well settled that
the Supreme Court can review the judgment of a state's highest court, "even when a
State is a formal party [defendant] and is successful in the inferior court," because the
proceeding before the Supreme Court "is not a suit within the meaning of the [Eleventh]
Amendment." McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages, 496 U.S . 18, 27 (1990)
(quoting General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 233 (1908) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
Of course, Supreme Court review of state-court judgments presents issues
distinct from those raised by intermediate appellate review of federal district court
judgments; but the doctrine that the Supreme Court can review state-court judgments in
cases involving states has its roots in "a time when individual litigants could invoke
review in the Supreme Court as a matter of right." James E. Pfander, An Intermediate
Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Federal Appellate Court Review of State-Court
Judgments After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. REV. 161, 226 (1998)-a pedigree which
suggests the two contexts may share a greater similarity than is at first apparent. See
id. at 225 ("One has difficulty in seeing how the Eleventh Amendment could
simultaneously leave untouched the Court's own exercise of appellate authority and
curtail all other federal appellate power.").
The concept that an appeal is not a "suit" within the meaning of the
Amendment has been subject to criticism, particularly by proponents of the "diversity"
theory. See supra note 28. As Justice Souter has observed, "[w]hether or not an appeal
is a 'suit' in its own right, it is certainly a means by which an appellate court exercises
jurisdiction over a 'suit' that began in the courts below." Seminole Tribe, 517 U .S. at 113
n.10 (Souter, J. , joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Likewise, in the
leading discussion of the issue, Professor Jackson has offered reasons why "the
proposition that a 'suit' does not include a n 'appeal' is only barely plausible." Vicki C.
Jackson, The Sup reme Court, the Eleventh A mendment, and State Sovereign Immunity,
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position. But at any rate, states should not be able to avoid
A rizona intervention merely by raising the specter of such an
appeal. The possibility that a tribe might t ake an appeal in
which the United States did not join320 raises no more of an
issue than does the possibility that the United States might
decide, part-way through the litigation, to drop its claim.32 1 In
eit her event, the state can raise its argument once the tribe is on
its own; but until then, hypothetical scenarios provide no basis
for barring a tribe's claim. (If the contrary were t rue, it would
not have been proper for the Special Master to have permitted
the Tribes to intervene in Arizona, for although A rizona was an
original proceeding in the Supreme Court, the parties could and
did take exception to the Supreme Cour t from the
determinations of the Special Master, a process lit tle different in
function from taking an appeal from t h e determinations of a
98 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1988). These critiques, however, appear to presume the validity of
the diversity theory, for if instead, as the majority of the Court believes, state sovereign
immunity is a constitutional bar to fe deral question suits against states, then the
conclusion that an appeal is a "suit" would prevent Supreme Court review of num erous
sta te-court decisions on federal questions. Notwithstanding that the diversity theory is
considerably more plausible than the current Court's account, the latter is the law of the
land, and it provides litigants with a basis on which to argue that appeals are not barred
by state sovereign immunity.
320. On a practical note, in such event the tribal appellant should ask the appellate
court to vacate the dismissal of the United States' claims as well as the tribe's. Although
an a ppellant normally lacks standing to assert the rights of co-parties, courts have
recognized exceptions where there is a particularly close relationship between the
appellant and the other party. Moreover, an appellate court has the power to afford
relief to a non-appellant if necessary in order to grant effective relief to the appellant.
S ee, e.g., Goldie's Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 468 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984)
("The Levins have standing to contest the grant of the preliminary injunction issued
against the other defendants, even though those defendants have not appealed ....
Even if the injunction is vacated as to the Levins, an injunction in effect against the
Superior Court, the Sheriff, the Clerk, and the Marshall leaves the Levins powerless to
enforce their state court judgment."); see also 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 3902, at 73 & n.16
(1992) (citing Goldie's Bookstore). In cases where the Arizona doctrine is the tribal
plaintiff's sole means of avoiding state sovereign immunity problems, effective relief to
the tribal appellant will require the reinstatement of the United States' claims as well.
Cf Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1986) (allowing Maine-which had intervened
below because the federal crime involved a state statute-to appeal and seek
reinstatement of the guilty plea in a federal criminal case in which the United States
dismissed its appeal from the reversal of the defendant's guilty plea); Sanguine, Ltd. v.
United States Dep't of Interior, 798 F.2d 389, 390-91 (lOth Cir. 1986) (after United
States consented to decree enjoining enforcement of a rule adopted by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, nine Native Americans intervened to defend their interests in the rule's
enforcement; court held that "this case presents a unique situation in which prejudice to
the intervenors can be avoided only by setting aside the prior judgment and allowing the
opportunity to litigate the merits of the case").
321. See supra note 255 .
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lower court.)
CONCLUSION

The discussion above makes clear that some tensions may
arise, in the context of Arizona intervention, between the United
States' interest in maintaining control of the litigation and a
tribal plaintiff's efforts to protect tribal interests . Under the
Arizona doctrine, a tribal plaintiff arguably can assert
additional claims relating to the same transaction sued upon by
t he United States and can seek additional relief. The tribe may
also make arguments that differ from those made by the United
States. 1-\nd if the United States decides not to appeal an
adverse judgment, the tribal plaintiff may attempt to do so in its
stead.
Such tensions, however, do not mean that a tribal plaintiffs
intervention offends state sovereign immunity. Participation by
a tribal intervenor should aid the United States in fulfilling its
trust obligations to the tribe by allowing the tribe to monitor
and supplement the United States' presentation of claims and
issues. Moreover, while a tribal intervenor can affect the course
of the litigation in important ways, the United States always
has the option of seeking to dismiss its own claims. To the
extent that the Arizona doctrine provides the sole basis for a
tribe's assertion of claims against a state defendant, the United
States' power to dismiss its own complaint gives it veto power
over the tribal claims. Concededly, the United States' dismissal
of its claims is constrained by the federal trust responsibility,
but that fact does not affect the Alden analysis. Rather, if
fiduciary responsibilities narrow or eliminate the United States'
discretion to seek dismissal of its claims when a tribal
intervenor is a party to the suit, the same responsibilities would
apply to a suit by the United States alone. In sum, participation
by a tribal intervenor does not diminish the United States'
ultimate discretion to guide the course of the suit, and thus it
presents no problem under Alden.
Consequently, courts' long-standing practice of permitting
Arizona intervention by tribal litigants should continue
undisturbed by the Court's current vision of state sovereign
immunity. Though the Court's recent decisions have extended
state sovereign immunity far beyond the textual limits of the
Eleventh Amendment and will, in the view of many, create
significant and unwarranted problems in the enforcement of
federal laws, in the particular context of tribal intervention in
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federal suits against states the Alden Court's analysis m erely
reinforces Arizona's continued viability.

